The Like-Kind Exchange Equity Conundrum by Borden, Bradley T.
Florida Law Review
Volume 60 | Issue 3 Article 3
11-18-2012
The Like-Kind Exchange Equity Conundrum
Bradley T. Borden
brad.borden@brooklaw.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Corporation and Enterprise Law Commons, Property Law and Real Estate
Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by
an authorized administrator of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact outler@law.ufl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bradley T. Borden, The Like-Kind Exchange Equity Conundrum, 60 Fla. L. Rev. 643 (2008).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol60/iss3/3
* Associate Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law, Topeka, Kansas;
LL.M. and J.D., University of Florida Levin College of Law; M.B.A. and B.B.A., Idaho State
University. I thank Kelly Anders, Richard Beck, Steven Dean, Kristin Hickman, Ali Khan, Leandra
Lederman, Marty McMahon, William Merkel, and Michael Hunter Schwartz for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I thank the participants of the International Conference
on Law and Society in the Twenty-First Century: 2007 Joint Annual Meetings of the Law and
Society Association, and the Research Committee on Sociology of Law in Berlin, Germany, who
provided helpful feedback on my presentation of an earlier draft of this Article. I thank Washburn
University School of Law for supporting this scholarship. Finally, I thank my wife Samantha and
daughter Claire for their unwavering support and encouragement in this undertaking. All opinions
and any errors are my own.
643
THE LIKE-KIND EXCHANGE EQUITY CONUNDRUM
Bradley T. Borden*
Abstract
The tax-free treatment of like-kind exchanges presents one of tax law’s
most compelling equity conundrums. Tax law generally does not tax
property holders on the property’s appreciation but does tax gain or loss
recognized by property sellers and exchangers of non-like-kind property.
In the basic Aristotelian system, equity requires that likes be treated alike,
but the system does not provide criteria to determine what is alike.
Depending upon the criteria, exchangers of like-kind property can be
similar either to holders or to sellers and exchangers of non-like-kind
property. The equity conundrum asks whether tax law should treat
exchangers of like-kind property either the same as holders of property or
the same as sellers and exchangers of non-like-kind property. This Article
frames the conundrum in Rawlsian and Hohfeldian concepts. This framing
suggests first that holders should not be taxed on property’s appreciation.
Second, this framing explains that once tax law exempts holders’
appreciation from taxation, equity requires that exchanges of like-kind
property should also be exempt from taxation. Thus, equity suggests that
the tax law should treat exchangers of like-kind property and property
holders similarly.
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1. I.R.C. § 1031 (West 2008).
2. Congress enacted the predecessor to section 1031 in 1921. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch.
136, § 202(c), 42 Stat. 227, 230 (current version at I.R.C. § 1031) (“For the purposes of this title,
on an exchange of property, real, personal or mixed, for any other such property, no gain or loss
shall be recognized unless the property received in exchange has a readily realizable market value;
but even if the property received in exchange has a readily realizable market value, no gain or loss
shall be recognized (1) [w]hen any such property held for investment, or for productive use in a
trade or business (not including stock-in-trade or other property held primarily for sale), is
exchanged for property of a like kind or use . . . .”). For a review of the history of section 1031, see
Bradley T. Borden, Reverse Like-Kind Exchanges: A Principled Approach, 20 VA. TAX REV. 659,
664–87 (2001) (discussing the purpose of section 1031 in the context of the section 1031 exchange
requirement). See also Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Section 1031: We Don’t Need Another Hero, 60
S. CAL. L. REV. 397, 400–41 (1987) (discussing the origins of section 1031, traditional explanations
of its purpose, and possible factors influencing its enactment).
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I.  INTRODUCTION
Section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) generally allows a
property holder to ignore the property’s appreciation when exchanging the
property for like-kind property.  This provision of the Code is approaching1
its ninetieth anniversary  and has recently received significant public2
2
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3. See, e.g., Peter C. Beller, Other People’s Money, FORBES, Apr. 23, 2007, at 38 (reporting
Donald K. McGhan’s acquisition of a qualified intermediary and his misuse of $95 million of
exchange deposits); Peter Lattman & Kemba Dunham, Tax Strategy for Real Estate Hits Rocky
Turf: “QI” Ploy Draws Focus as Middlemen Develop Financial Difficulties, WALL ST. J., May
26–27, 2007, at B1 (reporting the failure of two section 1031 qualified intermediaries); Most
Popular Articles on WSJ.com on May 28, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2007, at B2 (reporting that Lattman
and Dunham’s May 26–27 section 1031 article about section 1031 was the most e-mailed and
second-most viewed article for the reported period); Rachel Emma Silverman, Risky “1031s” Have
Safeguards, WALL ST. J., May 31, 2007, at D6 (identifying tactics that exchangers may employ to
protect exchange proceeds).
4. See Beller, supra note 3, at 38–39; Lattman & Dunham, supra note 3. The Treasury
created the section 1031 qualified intermediary to make like-kind exchanges more convenient and
accessible. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(g)(4) (as amended in 2002) (describing qualified
intermediaries). Prior to the promulgation of the qualified-intermediary regulations, the common-
law principles of constructive receipt and agency governed like-kind exchanges. See Borden, supra
note 2, at 669–73 (discussing the exchange requirement’s property-for-property element, which
prohibits the exchanger’s actual or constructive receipt of proceeds from the sale of relinquished
property). The qualified-intermediary regulations create a safe harbor that allows exchangers to
exchange property with confidence that they will not be in constructive receipt of exchange
proceeds and that the qualified intermediary will not be the exchanger’s agent. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1031(k)-1(g)(1), -1(g)(4)(i) (as amended in 2002).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 49–57 (listing typical exchange structures); see also
BRADLEY T. BORDEN, TAX-FREE SWAPS: USING SECTION 1031 LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES TO
PRESERVE INVESTMENT NET WORTH 71–191 (2007) (describing the various exchange structures).
6. See Beller, supra note 3, at 39.
7. See Lattman & Dunham, supra note 3.
8. See Beller, supra note 3, at 39.
9. But see Kemba J. Dunham, Tax Benefit Falls from Favor: Fraud Claims, High Prices for
Commercial Properties Curb Use of “1031” Strategy, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2007, at B13
(discussing a recent downturn in the number of section 1031 exchanges and attributing the
attention.  The recent attention results from the reported demise of two3
section 1031 qualified intermediaries.  Qualified intermediaries facilitate4
section 1031 tax-free exchanges. As part of the facilitation function,
qualified intermediaries receive and hold the proceeds from the sale of
exchange property.  The reported size of the exchange-balances of the two5
failed qualified intermediaries indicates the popularity of section 1031
exchanges—one qualified intermediary reportedly held as much as $95
million of exchange proceeds  and the other as much as $151 million of6
exchange proceeds.7
The failure of qualified intermediaries is unfortunate because many
exchangers will likely lose the exchange proceeds that the qualified
intermediaries held.  The qualified-intermediary failures will likely compel8
regulation of qualified intermediaries, including account maintenance
rules, and more due diligence by exchangers choosing a qualified
intermediary. Thus, reports of the qualified-intermediary failures will help
strengthen the qualified-intermediary industry but probably will not affect
section 1031’s popularity among property owners.  Section 1031 has9
3
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downturn, in part, to the slowdown in the real estate market and perhaps to the recent qualified-
intermediary failures).
10. See Lattman & Dunham, supra note 3 (“The actions ‘of a few persons should not taint
either the broad 1031 market, which allows taxpayers to save significant taxes legally, or the honest
[qualified intermediaries] who provide a useful service at low cost.’” (quoting Richard Lipton, tax
attorney at Baker & McKenzie LLP)).
11. See, e.g., Rachel Emma Silverman, Bartering to Avoid Taxes: Popular Real-Estate
Strategy Is Increasingly Used to Defer Capital Gains on Other Assets, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2005,
at D1 (describing a baseball memorabilia exchange structured as a section 1031 exchange).
12. IPX1031 is a subsidiary of Fidelity Nation Information Services, Inc. (NYSE: FIS). See
IPX1031—About IPX1031, http://www.ipx1031.com/about.html (last visited May 6, 2008).
13. Letter from Radah Butler, President & Suzanne Goldstein Baker, Gen. Counsel, IPX1031,
to The Honorable Donald L. Korb, Chief Counsel, IRS (May 3, 2006), in TAX NOTES TODAY, May
15, 2006, available at 2006 TNT 93-48 (Lexis) [hereinafter IPX1031 Letter].
14. See id.
15. The several hundred qualified intermediaries that are members of the Federation of
Exchange Accommodators (FEA) are listed on the FEA’s website. FEA, Member/QI Locator,
http://www.1031.org/memberlocator/index.asp (last visited May 6, 2008). In addition to those
qualified-intermediary companies, many attorneys, certified public accountants, and others provide
qualified-intermediary services, even though they are not members of the FEA. See BORDEN, supra
note 5, at 22–25 (describing the various types of qualified intermediaries).
16. IPX1031 is the self-proclaimed largest qualified intermediary in the country. See
IPX1031 Letter, supra note 13. Therefore, other qualified intermediaries will not facilitate the
volume of exchanges that IPX1031 facilitates. Nonetheless, the several hundred other qualified
intermediaries likely facilitate tens of thousands of exchanges each year.
become a significant part of the U.S. economy, and the failure of the
qualified intermediaries makes up only a small part of section 1031’s
story.10
Before the demise of the two qualified intermediaries, section 1031
often received positive public attention,  and property owners frequently11
exchanged like-kind property. Recently, a qualified intermediary,
Investment Property Exchange Services, Inc. (IPX1031),  sent to the12
Internal Revenue Service a letter (the IPX1031 Letter)  that provides13
some insight into section 1031’s popularity and scope. According to the
IPX1031 Letter, IPX1031 facilitated 31,000 like-kind exchanges over a
recent eighteen-month period.  IPX1031 is one of several hundred14
professional qualified intermediaries.  One can appreciate the popularity15
of section 1031 by extrapolating the number of exchanges that IPX1031
facilitates to include the exchanges facilitated by the hundreds of other
qualified intermediaries.  Based on that extrapolation, annual section 103116
exchanges could number into the hundreds of thousands.
The IPX1031 Letter also suggests that a significant cross section of
property owners exchange property under section 1031. IPX1031’s
analysis of 74,000 exchanges revealed that the vast majority (70%) of
4
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17. See IPX1031 Letter, supra note 13.
18. Id.
19. A primary motivation, besides tax reasons and management flexibility, for owning
property through limited partnerships and limited liability companies is the liability protection that
such entities provide their owners. See, e.g., Rebecca J. Huss, Revamping Veil Piercing for All
Limited Liability Entities: Forcing the Common Law Doctrine into the Statutory Age, 70 U. CIN.
L. REV. 95, 96–101 (2001). The members of a limited liability company and the limited partners
of a limited partnership are generally not personally liable for any liabilities arising with respect
to property owned by the respective legal entities. Id. at 101–02.
20. IPX1031 Letter, supra note 13.
21. Id.
22. This estimate is the product of multiplying the total number of exchanges considered
(31,000) by the median value of exchange proceeds received ($220,000), rounded to the nearest
billion. The estimate is conservative because the minimum dollar amount received would not be
less than zero, but the amount of exchange proceeds received on the largest exchanges could be
quite significant. The estimate also does not include the total value of property exchanged because
many of the exchange properties will be subject to liability. The amount deposited with IPX1031
in such situations would include only the difference between the fair market value of the property
transferred and the liability to which the transferred property was subject. See id. Thus, the total
dollar value of property exchanged with IPX1031 is probably significantly larger than the $6.82
billion estimate. As further evidence of the conservative nature of the estimate, another exchange
company claims to have facilitated about $10 billion of exchanges in 2006. See Lattman &
Dunham, supra note 3.
23. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2006, at 520
tbl.753 (125th ed. 2006), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/06statab/business.pdf
(reporting that total private-equity capital in 2004 was $62.244 billion).
24. In contrast, mergers and acquisitions activity was estimated at $1.318 trillion in 2003. See
exchangers were individuals.  The other significant class of17
exchangers—partnerships, limited liability companies, and
trusts—constituted 24% of the total exchangers.  Because many18
individuals form limited partnerships or limited liability companies
through which they own property,  undoubtedly individuals comprise a19
significant portion of that class of exchangers. The remaining 6% of
exchangers were corporations.  Thus, individuals constitute the vast20
majority of taxpayers exchanging property under section 1031.
The financial information in the IPX1031 Letter also indicates the
breadth of section 1031’s popularity. The median amount of exchange
proceeds received by IPX1031 for an exchange was $220,000.  Based on21
the 31,000 exchanges facilitated by IPX1031, a conservative estimate of
IPX1031’s exchange volume is about $7 billion.  Extrapolating this22
amount to include all of the exchanges facilitated by the hundreds of other
qualified intermediaries manifests that section 1031 exchanges amount to
tens of billions (if not hundreds of billions) of dollars in annual exchanges.
This amount rivals the country’s annual private-equity commitments.23
Such activity demonstrates that section 1031 plays an important role in the
United States’ tax law and economy.24
5
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id. at 520 tbl.751. Section 1031 activity is minimal compared to the mergers and acquisitions
activity.
25. See, e.g., Fred B. Brown, Proposal to Reform the Like Kind and Involuntary Conversion
Rules in Light of Fundamental Tax Policies: A Simpler, More Rational and More Unified
Approach, 67 MO. L. REV. 705, 717–18, 735–39 (2002) (arguing that horizontal equity (other than
perhaps in perception) does not inform the analysis of section 1031 but efficiency suggests that the
definition of like-kind property is too broad); Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 441–45 (arguing that
section 1031 violates both equity and efficiency); Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Commentary, Rollover
Is Better than Section 1031, but Why Stop There?, 92 TAX NOTES 1111, 1113 (2001) (positing that
section 1031 violates equity because it allows taxpayers to exchange only certain types of property
and violates efficiency because it affects taxpayers’ investment decisions); Steven J. Willis, Of
[Im]permissible Illogic and Section 1031, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 72, 72–73 (1981) (criticizing the
confused state of the law regarding the definition of exchange prior to the promulgation of the
section 1031 deferred-exchange safe-harbor regulations); see also Joseph M. Dodge & Jay A.
Soled, Debunking the Basis Myth Under the Income Tax, 81 IND. L.J. 539, 593 (2006) (“Tax-free
like-kind exchanges under Code section 1031 (which mostly occur with respect to investment real
estate) not only pose complex basis rules, but even worse present a major opportunity for
overstating basis.” (footnote omitted)). But see Erik M. Jensen, The Uneasy Justification for Special
Treatment of Like-Kind Exchanges, 4 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 193, 199–215 (1985) (concluding that
there is an appeal to treating the exchanger of like-kind property and the holder of property
similarly, but recognizing that the stated rationales for section 1031 (continuity of investment,
administrative convenience, protection against loss recognition, and economic efficiency) are
plagued with weaknesses).
26. In addition to the favorable tax treatment that section 1031 affords to a large cross section
of the taxpayer population, section 1031 also provides a living to thousands of tax advisors,
lawyers, and exchange accommodators. Each of these constituents supports section 1031. For
example, the FEA is politically active in issues related to section 1031. See FEA, Industry
Leadership, http://1031.org/aboutFEA/leadership.htm (last visited May 6, 2008) (identifying the
FEA’s political activities on both the state and federal levels).
27. See Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and Recognition Rules
Under the Federal Income Tax, 48 TAX L. REV. 1, 45 (1992) (“The similarity of the items
exchanged suggests weaker nontax reasons for exchanging them, and thus a greater likelihood that
taxing such exchanges would merely deter them, rather than raise revenue.”).
28. See infra Part IV.
Although section 1031 is popular among property owners, it is the
subject of significant academic criticism.  The popularity of section 103125
guarantees that it receives significant political support.  Yet the political26
support alone may not explain section 1031’s continuance. Tax policy also
appears to support section 1031. For example, one commentator has
demonstrated that efficiency supports the concept of section 1031, even if
efficiency does not support the scope of section 1031.  This Article27
focuses on the other major principle of tax policy—equity. Section 1031
critics claim that section 1031 violates equity; others claim that equity
supports section 1031.  These contradictory claims highlight the like-kind28
exchange equity conundrum.
This Article posits that if tax law exempts property appreciation from
taxation, then comparative equity obligates tax law to exempt exchanges
6
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29. See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1) (2000). The basis rules of section 1031(d) require that the
exchanger take a basis in replacement property equal to the basis the exchanger had in relinquished
property, adjusted for gain or loss recognized and boot received. Id. § 1031(d). Those basis rules
defer any gain or loss that an exchanger does not recognize on the exchange. See Jensen, supra note
25, at 196. As a consequence, section 1031 exchanges are often referred to as tax-deferred
exchanges. Nonrecognition of gain or loss on an exchange makes the exchange tax-free. Therefore,
section 1031 exchanges are often referred to as tax-free exchanges. Because deferral is not central
to this Article’s analysis, this Article focuses on the tax-free aspect of section 1031 exchanges.
30. See I.R.C. § 1001(c) (providing that taxpayers must recognize realized gain unless a Code
provision specifically allows nonrecognition); id. § 1031(a)(1) (providing that no gain or loss shall
be recognized on the exchange of like-kind property held for productive use in a trade or business,
or for investment). As a tax-planning tool, section 1031 is most popular for its deferral of gain
recognition. Though section 1031 also defers loss, this Article focuses on gain deferral. For a more
in-depth discussion of section 1031, see generally BRADLEY T. BORDEN, TAX-FREE LIKE-KIND
EXCHANGES (Civic Research Institute 2008).
31. To simplify the analysis and discussion, this Article assumes that the property’s adjusted
basis equals its purchase price. This would generally not be the case with an apartment building or
other depreciable property because allowable depreciation deductions reduce the property’s cost
basis. See id. § 1011(a) (defining adjusted basis as cost basis determined under section 1012
adjusted as provided in section 1016); see also id. § 1012 (providing that basis equals the cost of
of like-kind property from taxation. To assert thusly, the Article accepts
that in a perfect world tax law should tax income, including accretion, in
its broadest sense. Nonetheless, Part V demonstrates that in an imperfect
world taxing property owners on the appreciation in value of difficult-to-
value and illiquid property would violate equity. Thus, equity generally
requires exempting from taxation appreciation in the value of held
property. Once the law exempts appreciation in value from taxation, the
law should exempt like-kind exchanges from taxation. To provide the
necessary background for Part V’s analyses and conclusions, this Article
first provides a brief overview of section 1031 and equity, and then
describes the equity conundrum in detail.
II.  OVERVIEW OF SECTION 1031
In concept, section 1031 is simple. In application, it is a bit complex,
but the section 1031 industry helps make that complexity manageable.
Section 1031 theory, on the other hand, presents a worthy challenge.
Section 1031 provides that a property owner may dispose of property tax-
free in exchange for like-kind property, if the exchanger held the
transferred property and will hold the acquired property for use in a trade
or business, or for investment.  Thus, section 1031 allows the tax-free29
transfer of property by exempting from recognition gain or loss that an
exchanger realizes on the transfer of property.30
The following example illustrates the application of section 1031.
Assume that Beatrice owns Property B, an office building she purchased
three years ago for $50,000 to hold as rental property.  When Property B31
7
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property); id. § 1016(a)(2)(A) (providing that allowable depreciation reduces a property’s basis).
32. See id. § 1031(d).
33. For example, if Beatrice sells Property E for $120,000 cash three years after the
exchange, she will recognize $70,000 of gain ($120,000 of amount realized minus $50,000 of
adjusted basis). See id. § 1001(a).
34. The gain equals the difference between the $100,000 Drew receives and the $50,000
adjusted basis he has in Property D. See id. § 1001(a), (c).
35. See id. § 61(a)(3) (requiring taxpayers to include gains from dealings in property in gross
income). See generally I.R.C. § 1 (West 2008) (imposing tax on individuals).
36. See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(2) (2000).
37. See Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Individual Tax Reform for Fairness and Simplicity: Let
Economic Growth Fend for Itself, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 459, 479 (“There is no good reason that
investors should be able to move among various real estate investments without paying taxes on
realized gains when the same privilege is not accorded to reinvestment of sales proceeds in a
different investment.”); see also Brown, supra note 25, at 735–40 (arguing that the definition of
like-kind real property is too broad and that the categorization rules used for depreciation would
is worth $100,000, Eddy offers to transfer Property E, an apartment
building worth $100,000, to Beatrice in exchange for Property B. Beatrice
and Eddy exchange properties, after which Beatrice uses Property E as a
hotel. Assuming the transaction satisfies all of the requirements of section
1031, Beatrice will recognize no gain on the transaction and she will take
a $50,000 basis in Property E.  If Beatrice later sells Property E for32
$50,000 or more in a taxable transaction, she will recognize any gain she
deferred on the exchange of Property B.33
Contrast the tax result of Beatrice’s exchange with the tax result of
Drew’s sale of Property D. Drew purchased Property D, an office building,
three years ago for $50,000. Pam offers to purchase Property D from Drew
for $100,000 cash. Drew will recognize $50,000 of gain on the sale of
Property D to Pam.  Drew would likely owe tax on the $50,000 of gain34
that he recognizes.  If Drew had exchanged Property D for non-like-kind35
property worth $100,000, he would have similarly recognized $50,000 of
gain and probably would have owed tax on the gain. Thus, the tax law
treats Beatrice, the exchanger of like-kind property, differently from Drew,
the seller of property and the exchanger of non-like-kind property. Section
1031 is therefore not conceptually difficult—if a person satisfies the
requirements of section 1031, the person does not recognize taxable gain
or loss on the exchange of property.
In practice, section 1031 is more complicated because it applies only
to certain types of transactions and specific types of property. Further, the
vast majority of transactions that qualify for section 1031 nonrecognition
are not simple simultaneous property swaps. Section 1031 applies only to
exchanges of certain property, specifically excluding property such as
inventory, corporate stock, notes, and interests in partnerships.36
Commentators suggest that section 1031’s broad definition of like-kind
real property favors real estate.  Yet section 1031 applies generally to all37
8
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be more appropriate).
38. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-2(b) (as amended in 2005); see also Rev. Proc. 2003-39,
2003-1 C.B. 971 (providing a safe harbor for like-kind exchange programs that are “ongoing
program[s] involving multiple exchanges of 100 or more properties”).
39. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-2(b)(2)(iv) (as amended in 2005).
40. See Rev. Rul. 76-214, 1976-1 C.B. 218 (allowing nonrecognition of gain under section
1031 on the exchange of Mexican 50-peso noncurrency bullion-type gold coins for Australian 100-
corona noncurrency bullion-type gold coins); Silverman, supra note 11 (describing exchanges of
baseball memorabilia that the exchanger hoped would qualify for section 1031 nonrecognition).
41. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-2(c)(3), ex. 1 (as amended in 2005) (providing that a
copyright in a novel is like kind to a copyright in a different novel).
42. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 200602034 (Jan. 13, 2006) (ruling that two patents are like
kind).
43. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 200035005 (Sept. 1, 2000) (ruling that the exchange of an
FCC radio license for an FCC television license qualified for section 1031 nonrecognition).
44. See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1) (2000).
45. See, e.g., 65 CONG. REC. 2773, 2799 (1924) (“Mr. La Guardia: Under this paragraph is
it necessary to exchange property? Suppose the property is sold and other property immediately
acquired for the same business. Would that be a gain or loss, assuming there is greater value in the
property acquired? . . . Mr. Green of Iowa: If the property is reduced to cash and there is a gain, of
course it will be taxed. Mr. La Guardia: Suppose that cash is immediately put back into the
property, into the business? Mr. Green of Iowa: That would not make any difference.”); Coleman
v. Comm’r, 180 F.2d 758, 760 (8th Cir. 1950) (“Petitioner . . . must bring himself squarely within
the explicit provisions of the exception there provided for.”).
46. See Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238, 242–43 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding that the
taxpayers’ receipt of sale proceeds and immediate reinvestment in like-kind property destroyed the
section 1031 exchange, even though the taxpayers clearly intended a section 1031 exchange).
47. See, e.g., Greene v. Comm’r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 512 (1991) (finding that the requirements
of section 1031 were not satisfied when a taxpayer could withdraw money from trust account
without any substantial limitations).
business-use and investment property. Thus, under section 1031, property
owners may exchange tangible personal property—such as vehicles and
equipment,  aircraft,  and collectibles —and intangible property such as38 39 40
copyrights,  patents,  and licenses.41 42 43
To qualify for nonrecognition under section 1031, the disposition of
property must be part of a transaction that satisfies section 1031’s
definition of “exchange.”  Section 1031’s definition of exchange presents44
a paradox of strictness and liberalness. Congress and courts strictly
interpret the exchange requirement by prohibiting an exchanger’s actual
or constructive receipt of exchange proceeds.  Thus, if an exchanger sells45
property, receives the sale proceeds, and immediately reinvests the
proceeds in like-kind property, the seller will not obtain section 1031
nonrecognition.  An exchanger would also lose section 103146
nonrecognition if the exchanger directs sale proceeds to an escrow account
or trust that the exchanger controls.  Even though the exchanger does not47
actually receive the proceeds, the exchanger’s constructive receipt through
9
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48. See Halpern v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 255, 258–59 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (holding that
the exchanger’s title insurance company’s receipt of exchange proceeds disqualified the transaction
from section 1031 nonrecognition because the exchanger could request cash payment of the
proceeds from the insurance company and thus the exchanger had constructively received the
proceeds).
49. See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3) (providing that an exchanger must identify replacement property
within forty-five days after transferring relinquished property and generally receive the replacement
property within 180 days after transferring the relinquished property); see also Starker v. United
States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1353–55 (9th Cir. 1979) (granting section 1031 nonrecognition to a multiple-
party exchange that took two years to complete).
50. See, e.g., Biggs v. Comm’r, 632 F.2d 1171, 1178 (5th Cir. 1980) (granting section 1031
nonrecognition to an intermediary-facilitated multi-party exchange that involved an advance from
the exchanger to the intermediary, as well as the direct deeding of property from the exchanger to
the relinquished-property buyer and from the replacement-property seller to the exchanger); W.D.
Haden Co. v. Comm’r, 165 F.2d 588, 590 (5th Cir. 1948) (holding that an exchange facilitated by
an intermediary involving the direct deeding of property from the exchanger to the relinquished-
property buyer and from the replacement-property seller to the exchanger qualified for section 1031
nonrecognition); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 32 B.T.A. 82, 83, 88 (1935) (granting
nonrecognition to an exchange facilitated by an intermediary).
51. See Rev. Proc. 2000-37, 2000-2 C.B. 308, modified by Rev. Proc. 2004-51, 2004-2 C.B.
294 (providing a safe harbor for structuring title-parking reverse exchanges).
52. See Coastal Terminals, Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 333, 336, 339 (4th Cir. 1963)
(holding that an improvements exchange facilitated by a third party qualified for section 1031
nonrecognition).
53. See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3) (allowing 180 days to elapse between when the exchanger
initially transfers relinquished property and subsequently acquires replacement property); see also
Starker, 602 F.2d at 1353–55 (granting section 1031 nonrecognition to a transfer of relinquished
property even though the exchanger did not acquire replacement property until two years later);
Treas. Reg. §  1.1031(k)-1(a) (as amended in 2002) (“For purposes of section 1031 and this section,
a deferred exchange is defined as an exchange in which, pursuant to an agreement, the taxpayer
transfers property held for productive use in a trade or business or for investment (the ‘relinquished
property’) and subsequently receives property to be held either for productive use in a trade or
business or for investment (the ‘replacement property’).”).
54. See W.D. Haden Co., 165 F.2d at 590 (holding that an intermediary-facilitated sale of
relinquished property to one party and acquisition of replacement property from another party
qualified for nonrecognition, even though the facilitator did not take title to either property);
Mercantile Trust Co., 32 B.T.A. at 83, 88 (holding that an intermediary-facilitated sale of
relinquished property to one party and acquisition of replacement property from another party
qualified for nonrecognition under the predecessor to section 1031); Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(g)
control over the proceeds prohibits section 1031 nonrecognition.48
On the other hand, Congress, the courts, and the Treasury liberally
apply the exchange requirement by allowing deferred exchanges,49
multiple-party exchanges,  reverse exchanges,  and improvements50 51
exchanges.  A deferred exchange is a transfer of property (the52
relinquished property) followed some time later by the receipt of other
like-kind property (the replacement property).  A multiple-party exchange53
allows an exchanger to transfer relinquished property to one party and to
receive replacement property from another party.  A reverse exchange54
10
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(as amended in 2002) (providing several safe harbors for structuring multiple-party exchanges).
55. See Rev. Proc. 2000-37, 2000-2 C.B. 308 (providing a safe harbor for structuring title-
parking reverse exchanges). See generally Borden, supra note 2, at 659 (discussing the title-parking
reverse-exchange safe harbor and theoretical support for “pure” reverse exchanges).
56. See generally Bradley T. Borden, Recent Developments in Build-to-Suit Exchanges, 44
TAX MGMT. MEMORANDUM 19 (2003) (reviewing the legal support for improvements exchanges
(also referred to as build-to-suit exchanges) and describing the various improvements-exchange
structures).
57. See generally BORDEN, supra note 5, at 99–192 (describing the various exchange
structures).
58. See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1).
59. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(b) (as amended in 1991).
60. See, e.g., Comm’r v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 268 (1958) (holding that exchanges
of oil payment rights for other real property do not qualify for like-kind treatment); Wiechens v.
United States, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1085 (D. Ariz. 2002) (holding that a water right that
constituted an interest in property under Arizona law was not like kind to other real property);
Capri, Inc. v. Comm’r, 65 T.C. 162, 181–82 (1975) (holding that a sale–leaseback did not qualify
for section 1031 nonrecognition where the lease was for ten years); Oregon Lumber Co. v. Comm’r,
20 T.C. 192, 197–98 (1953) (stating that even if the right to cut timber constituted real property
under the laws of Oregon, the court would not be bound to hold that the right was like kind to other
real property); Kimbell v. Comm’r, 41 B.T.A. 940, 951 (1940) (holding that an oil payment right
did not qualify for like-kind treatment when it was exchanged for interest in another oil lease,
leasehold equipment, and other personal property); Midfield Oil Co. v. Comm’r, 39 B.T.A. 1154,
1156–58 (1939) (holding that an oil payment is not like kind to an overriding royalty interest). See
generally Bradley T. Borden, The Whole Truth About Using Partial Real Estate Interests in Section
1031 Exchanges, 31 REAL EST. TAX’N 19, 19–32 (2003) (discussing the case law and rulings that
reveal that different real property interests are not like kind to other real property).
61. See Rev. Rul. 72-151, 1972-1 C.B. 225 (ruling that the exchange of real property for real
property and machinery is not an exchange solely for like-kind property). But see Kelly E. Alton
& Bradley T. Borden, Transforming Personal Tangible and Intangible Property into Real Property,
34 REAL EST. TAX’N 52, 53–56 (2007) (identifying situations in which personal property may be
bundled with real property interests and become like kind to other personal property).
allows an exchanger to acquire replacement property before disposing of
relinquished property.  An improvements exchange allows an exchanger55
to use proceeds from the sale of relinquished property to construct
improvements on replacement property.  Each of the various exchange56
structures may require significant planning and generally require the
services of a qualified intermediary or other exchange facilitator.57
To qualify for section 1031 nonrecognition, the relinquished property
and replacement property must be like kind.  Properties of the same58
nature and character are like kind.  Under the nature and character test,59
many types of interests in real property are like kind, but case law and IRS
rulings reveal that not all real property is like kind.  Real property60
generally is not of the same nature and character as personal property; thus
these properties are not like kind.  Because of the varied nature of61
personal property, the section 1031 regulations provide classification safe-
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62. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-2 (as amended in 2005) (providing safe harbors for personal
property that comes within the same “General Asset Class” or “Product Class”).
63. I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1).
64. See Moore v. Comm’r, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 1275 (2007), available at 2007 WL 1555852,
at *12–13 (holding that an exchange of a vacation home does not qualify for section 1031
nonrecognition). But see Rev. Proc. 2005-14, 2005-1 C.B. 528 (providing rules for applying section
1031 and section 121 to property used as both a principal residence and a business property).
65. I.R.C. § 1031(a)(2)(A).
66. Id. § 1031(a)(2)(B).
67. Id.
68. Id. § 1031(a)(2)(D).
69. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 12–24 (discussing the reported volume of one large
exchange company).
70. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 223 (5th ed. 1989). This definition refers to horizontal equity and is based on an abilities
theory. Equity may also be based on a benefits theory, under which “each taxpayer would be taxed
in line with his or her demand for public services.” Id. at 220. As discussed below, the appropriate
theory is a matter of debate and presents one of the difficulties of using equity as an analytical tool.
See infra text accompanying notes 182–88. To set the stage for the discussion of equity, this Article
accepts the abilities theory.
71. Robert Plotnick, The Concept and Measurement of Horizontal Inequity, 17 J. PUB. ECON.
373, 374 (1982).
72. Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT’L TAX J.
harbor rules for determining which personal properties are like kind.62
Thus, the like-kind-property requirement limits the application of section
1031.
Section 1031 also requires exchangers to hold the relinquished property
and replacement property “for productive use in a trade or business or for
investment.”  Thus, an exchange of personal-use property, such as a63
personal residence, does not qualify for section 1031 nonrecognition.64
Section 1031 also specifically excludes exchanges of other property. For
example, exchanges of inventory,  corporate stock,  notes,  and65 66 67
partnership interests  do not qualify for section 1031 nonrecognition.68
For the uninitiated, applying section 1031 may be daunting. As implied
above, however, the section 1031 industry has developed practices that
simplify the exchange process and spread the costs of exchanging over
thousands of exchanges.  Thus, the industry helps minimize the69
complexity of applying section 1031. The real challenge that section 1031
presents is the equity conundrum.
III.  OVERVIEW OF CONCEPTS OF EQUITY
Tax policy uses the term “equity” to refer to the concept that “people
with equal capacity [should] pay the same [amount of tax].”  Stated70
differently, “Units with the same level of well-being should be liable for
identical taxes or transfers,”  or “equals [should] be treated equally.”71 72
12
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139, 139 (1989).
73. See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 67, 75 (4th ed. 2003)
(identifying the distinction between procedural and substantive equity in international law).
74. See id. at 70 (recognizing that procedural equity may allow a judge to act “intra legem,
that is, within the law . . . as to achieve the law’s intent . . . . praeter legem, that is, beyond the
law . . . to fill in gaps and supplement the law with equitable rules . . . . [or] contra legem, that is,
against the law . . . [to achieve] an equitable result . . . despite the law’s explicit injunction”). The
type of equity that Professor Janis refers to as procedural equity is the type of equity recognized by
English law. See GEORGE TUCKER BISPHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 1 (Joseph D. McCoy ed.,
11th ed. 1931) (“Equity, in its technical and scientific legal sense, means neither natural justice nor
even all that portion of natural justice which is susceptible of being judicially enforced. It has, when
employed in the language of English law, a precise, definite and limited signification, and is used
to denote a system of justice which was administered in a particular court . . . .”); BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 579 (8th ed. 2004) (“[E]quity . . . . 3. The recourse to principles of justice to correct
or supplement the law as applied to particular circumstances <the judge decided the case by equity
because the statute did not fully address the issue>.”).
75. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 542–43 (1982)
(attributing the origin of the study of equality and the articulated statement of equality to Plato and
Aristotle). Aristotle was, however, less direct in his statement: “[I]f they are not equal, they will
not have what is equal, but this is the origin of quarrels and complaints—when either equals have
and are awarded unequal shares, or unequals equal shares.” ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk.
V ch. 3, at 112 (J.L. Ackrill & J.O. Urmson eds., W.D. Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1998). John
Stuart Mill used the term equality in discussing tax policy, recognizing that equality applies to all
laws, including tax laws. See JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 735
(Prometheus Books 2004) (1848) (“For what reason ought equality to be the rule in matters of
taxation? For the reason, that it ought to be so in all affairs of government. As a government ought
to make no distinction of persons or classes in the strength of their claims on it, whatever sacrifices
it requires from them should be made to bear as nearly as possible with the same pressure upon all;
That concept is not unique to tax policy. In fact, the tax policy concept of
equity most likely derives from the moral and philosophical discussions
of equity and equality. Although the term “equality” finds greater use in
moral and philosophical discussions, this Article, to stay consistent with
tax scholars’ general terminology, uses the term “equity” to refer to the
concept that likes should be treated alike.
This Article distinguishes substantive equity (treating likes alike and
ensuring just laws) from procedural equity.  Procedural equity refers to73
a judiciary’s ruling in the absence of law or against law based upon
principles that appear to produce a just result.  Focusing on whether the74
law treats similarly situated people similarly, this Article addresses
substantive, not procedural, equity.
A.  Aristotelian Concept of Equity
The tax policy concept of equity relates to the philosophical concept,
the origin of which is attributed to Aristotle: “[Equity] in morals means
this: things that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are
unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness.”75
13
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which, it must be observed, is the mode by which least sacrifice is occasioned on the whole.”). As
discussed below, equity has become the preferred term in tax analysis. See infra Part III.C.
76. See Kenneth W. Simons, Equality as a Comparative Right, 65 B.U. L. REV. 387, 393–94
(1985). 
77. Id.
78. Id. at 394.
79. Professor Simons used these examples to explain the concepts of lexical and comparative
equity. Id. 
80. Id. at 397.
81. Id. at 393, 397.
82. Id. at 397–98.
Moral and legal philosophers, and economists have devoted significant
thought to the concept of equity and its value as a normative tool. The
analytic value of Aristotelian equity depends upon whether it is
comparative or merely lexical. Equity can be interpreted as a derivative,
lexical, and descriptive concept—lexical equity.  Or equity can be76
interpreted as an essential, substantive (or comparative), and prescriptive
concept—comparative equity.  Lexical equity has no normative77
significance, but comparative equity does.78
Two simple examples illustrate the difference between lexical equity
and comparative equity.  First, assume Patti—the parent of three children,79
Mork, Mindy, and Magnum—tells the children, “I will take all of my
children to the movie on Friday.” This rule illustrates lexical equity. Each
child is one of Patti’s children, and, as such, each child has a right to go to
the movie with Patti on Friday. The children are alike in being children of
Patti. That likeness, however, does not determine their rights under the
rule. Instead the rule itself determines their rights.  Lexical equity is80
merely derivative, descriptive, and tautological because comparing Mindy
to Mork to determine her rights to go to the movie adds nothing to the
analysis.81
Second, assume Patti tells her children, “Next time I take Mork to the
movies, I will take Mindy and Magnum.” This rule illustrates comparative
equity. Mindy and Magnum can determine their right to go to the movie
only by comparing themselves to Mork.  Lexical equity does not answer82
the like-kind exchange equity conundrum, but comparative equity informs
the equity analysis and helps solve the conundrum. Thus, this Article relies
on comparative equity. But merely comparing parties does not always
satisfy an equity analysis; higher principles of equity may be necessary to
complete the analysis.
14
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83. See Clark v. Thompson, 206 F. Supp. 539, 542 (S.D. Miss. 1962) (holding that although
enforced segregation would deny equal protection of the laws, the plaintiffs were not entitled to an
injunction on the facts of the case), aff’d, 313 F.2d 637, 637–38 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 951 (1963); see also Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 218–19 (1971) (providing the facts
of the Clark case).
84. See Palmer, 403 U.S. at 219. The Court upheld the closing against an equal protection
challenge, explaining that the closing denied access to all and thus treated all alike. Id. at 219–21,
226. But see Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 225, 230–31 (1964) (holding that the closing
of public schools to maintain segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause).
85. See Westen, supra note 75, at 590.
86. See id. at 590–91 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244 n.11 (1976)). 
87. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 447 (rev. ed. 1999).
88. Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 272 (1983). We see
examples of this in modern culture. Bill Gates recently used equity as the theme of his remarks
given at a Harvard commencement. Gates said:
B.  Rawlsian Concept of Equity
Merely applying rules uniformly to people who are alike may result in
consequences that violate our sense of right and wrong. For example,
forced segregation of swimming pools in the city of Jackson, Mississippi,
would deny African-Americans equal protection of the laws.  Because83
African-Americans are not unlike other races in their desire to enjoy a
refreshing swim on a hot afternoon in Mississippi, Aristotelian equity, in
its simplest form, requires the city to treat African-Americans the same as
others. The city could have satisfied Aristotelian equity either by closing
the swimming pool to all people or by opening it to all people. The city
decided to do the former and closed the pool.  Closing the pool violates84
our sense of right and wrong because it treats members of a particular race
as inferior.  The Supreme Court eventually implicitly recognized that85
closing the pool to prohibit a particular group of people from swimming
results in unequal treatment because the closing stigmatizes that group.86
The Supreme Court’s eventual interpretation of equity incorporates
more than mere comparisons and similar treatment. This interpretation
provides a basis for defending equity as an independent norm. The
Aristotelian concept of equity, in its simplest form, does not recognize that
distinction. The Rawlsian concept of equity, however, provides direction
for distinguishing between simple comparisons and meaningful
comparisons. In particular, it helps establish the criteria that should
determine whether parties are like or unlike.
Rawls provides that equity “is defined by the first principle of justice
and by such natural duties as that of mutual respect; it is owed to human
beings as moral persons.”  Stated differently, “The essence of [equity]87
that matters in America is the idea that ‘one person is as good as another,’
that each of us is a respected participant in the society, a member who
counts for something.”  Under the Rawlsian concept of equity,88
15
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But humanity’s greatest advances are not in its discoveries—but in how those
discoveries are applied to reduce inequity. Whether through democracy, strong
public education, quality health care, or broad economic opportunity—reducing
inequity is the highest human achievement. 
. . . .
. . .  I hope you will judge yourselves not on your professional accomplishments
alone, but also on how well you have addressed the world’s deepest
inequities . . . [and] on how well you treated people a world away who have
nothing in common with you but their humanity. 
William Henry Gates III, Remarks of Bill Gates: Harvard Commencement (June 7, 2007), in HARV.
U. GAZETTE ONLINE, June 7, 2007, http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2007/06.14/99-gates.html
(second ellipsis in original).
89. See RAWLS, supra note 87, at 444 (“Equality of consideration puts no restrictions upon
what grounds may be offered to justify inequalities. There is no guarantee of substantive equal
treatment, since slave and caste systems (to mention extreme cases) may satisfy this conception.
The real assurance of equality lies in the content of the principles of justice and not in these
procedural presumptions.”); Karst, supra note 88, at 249 (“Stigma dissolves the human ties we call
‘acceptance’ and excludes the stigmatized from ‘belonging’ as equals. Stigma represents the
breakdown of empathy. . . . [I]t is the imposition of this status inequality itself that is harmful.”).
90. See Westen, supra note 75, at 572–74. For example, if people are divided into two
groups, men and women, so long as the laws applicable to men apply to all men and the laws
applicable to women apply to all women, the laws should not violate Aristotelian equality, even if
the laws put one group above the other. As discussed below, one difficulty in applying Aristotelian
equality is determining the criteria that create the class of likes. See infra Part V.A.
91. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I HAVE A DREAM: WRITINGS & SPEECHES THAT CHANGED
THE WORLD 45 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1992).
92. Karst, supra note 88, at 262–63.
stigmatizing a group of people or creating a caste system violates equity
because such actions differentiate groups and treat some people as not
quite human, representing a breakdown of justice and empathy.  This89
assessment recognizes a weakness of the Aristotelian concept of equity. If
a caste system groups likes in similar classes based on some criteria, rules
that apply to one class but not another might not violate the Aristotelian
concept of equity.  Such rules would, however, violate the Rawlsian90
concept of equity because they represent a breakdown of empathy. “[I]t
means that some are considered inferior, treated as though they deserve
less.”  By rejecting such treatment, the Rawlsian concept of equity solves91
some of the difficulties that the Aristotelian concept of equity poses.
Although requiring empathy and recognition of others’ dignity, the
Rawlsian concept of equity does not appear to require equal economic
status. One commentator suggested that “Americans accept wide
disparities in wealth and income, so long as the system remains open and
people at the bottom of the economic scale are relieved from the kinds of
deprivation that stigmatize or exclude them from participation in
society.”  Thus, if tax law closes the system to people at the bottom of the92
16
Florida Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol60/iss3/3
2008] THE LIKE-KIND EXCHANGE EQUITY CONUNDRUM 659
93. See infra Part V.A (considering the appropriate criteria for applying an equity analysis
to section 1031 exchanges in a regime that adopts the realization requirement).
94. See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A
PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 30 (1938) (“[W]e may say that tax burdens should bear similarly upon
persons whom we regard as in substantially similar circumstances, and differently where
circumstances differ.”); Richard A. Musgrave, ET, OT and SBT, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 3, 4 n.2 (1976)
(recognizing that Simons differentiated between horizontal equity and vertical equity without using
such terms explicitly).
95. A.C. PIGOU, A STUDY IN PUBLIC FINANCE 5 (3d rev. ed. 1962) (emphasis omitted);
accord HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GAYER, PUBLIC FINANCE 367 (8th ed. 2007) (“People in equal
positions should be treated equally.”); Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43
NAT’L TAX J. 113, 113 (1990) (describing horizontal equity as “requiring equal treatment of
equals”).
96. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
97. Musgrave, supra note 95, at 113.
98. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
99. Musgrave, supra note 95, at 113.
100. See ROSEN & GAYER, supra note 95, at 358 (“[A tax system] should distribute burdens
fairly across people with different abilities to pay.”).
101. Vertical equity requires tax law to “distribute burdens fairly across people with different
economic scale, then that law would violate the Rawlsian concept of
equity. Tax law could do this by burdening those in lower tax brackets to
prevent them from accumulating wealth and increasing discretionary
income. The Rawlsian concept of equity does not, however, require that
tax law equalize income. Rawlsian equity also may not solve some of the
other problems in Aristotelian equity. For example, Rawlsian equity does
not specifically establish the appropriate criteria for determining the best
location for the equity split that the realization requirement causes.93
C.  Economic Concept of Equity
Equity is an important part of tax policy and the analysis of tax laws.94
Tax policy divides equity into two subcategories: horizontal equity and
vertical equity. Horizontal equity requires that “similar persons should be
treated similarly.”  In other words, horizontal equity requires that likes be95
treated alike.  Vertical equity “call[s] for an appropriate differentiation96
among unequals.”  In other words, vertical equity requires that unalikes97
be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness.  To some extent,98
vertical equity incorporates the Rawlsian concept of equity. As one
commentator stated, vertical equity “is a matter of social taste and political
debate.”  More particularly, vertical equity informs the analysis and99
debate of the proper distribution of income,  which would not treat any100
group of people as inferior.
This Article focuses primarily on horizontal equity. Although vertical
equity raises significant concerns, it does not figure prominently in
discussions about section 1031.  Tax scholars have used horizontal equity101
17
Borden: The Like-Kind Exchange Equity Conundrum
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2008
660 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60
abilities to pay.” ROSEN & GAYER, supra note 95, at 358. Determining a fair distribution across
people with different abilities to pay is difficult. See MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 70, at
228–31 (discussing different alternatives for measuring ability to pay). A vertical-equity analysis
of section 1031 may consider whether people with greater ability to pay hold significant property
that qualifies for section 1031 treatment. If so, they may be able to reduce their tax burdens through
section 1031 more than taxpayers with less ability to pay are able to do. That possible inequity
warrants further study and analysis. This Article’s focus on horizontal equity does not present the
opportunity to consider section 1031’s effect on vertical equity.
102. See, e.g., SIMONS, supra note 94, at 30; Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income
Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 567, 574–80 (1965) (identifying and describing horizontal equity as
a criterion of federal tax policy).
103. See ROSEN & GAYER, supra note 95, at 369 (“We are forced to conclude that horizontal
equity, however defined, is a rather amorphous concept. Yet it has enormous appeal as a principle
of tax design. Notions of fairness among equals, regardless of their vagueness, will continue to play
an important role in the development of tax policy.”).
104. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 72, at 141, 148 (arguing that horizontal equity lacks
independent significance); see also David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory,
24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 43, 46 (2006) (“[H]orizontal equity can only be justified within the
framework of a theory of social justice that accepts the morality of the market distribution.”).
105. See infra Part V.A (discussing the inadequacy of horizontal equity if applied with
irrelevant criteria).
106. See Musgrave, supra note 95, at 117–20 (demonstrating how horizontal equity works in
second-best settings to determine the more appropriate tax based on change in welfare cost).
107. See infra Part IV.A.
108. See infra Part IV.B.
as a basis of analysis for years.  Horizontal equity has critics and102
difficulties, but it plays an important role in tax policy.  Critics of103
horizontal equity, like critics of equity in general, claim that horizontal
equity has no independent normative significance.  Using  irrelevant104
criteria also limits the utility of horizontal equity.  Nonetheless,105
horizontal equity may have independent normative significance in a
second-best setting to demonstrate a comparative right.106
Because the most significant part of this Article relies upon horizontal
equity, the Article uses the term equity to refer to horizontal equity. This
Article uses vertical equity to draw an appropriate distinction when
necessary.
IV.  LIKE-KIND EXCHANGE EQUITY CONUNDRUM
The different views of section 1031’s critics and supporters reveal the
like-kind exchange equity conundrum. Critics of section 1031 claim that
it violates equity.  Proponents of section 1031 claim that equity justifies107
section 1031.  Both groups cannot be correct. Before solving the equity108
conundrum, this Article identifies the claims that section 1031 violates
equity and the claims that equity supports section 1031.
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109. See McMahon, Jr., supra note 37, at 478–79 (recommending that Congress repeal section
1031 to “significantly enhance horizontal equity, make tax burdens more closely correspond with
true economic ability to pay, and increase tax revenues to deal with the budget deficit and other
priorities”). 
110. See id.
111. See McMahon, Jr. supra note 25, at 1113.
112. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-704, at 13 (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B., pt. 2, at 554, 564 (“If
all exchanges were made taxable, it would be necessary to evaluate the property received in
exchange in thousands of horse trades and similar barter transactions each year . . . . The committee
does not believe that the net revenue which could thereby be collected, particularly in these years,
would justify the additional administrative expense.”).
113. See Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 443–44; see also I.R.C. § 1031(b) (2000) (requiring an
exchanger to recognize realized gain to the extent of boot received in an exchange).
114. See Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 444.
115. See I.R.C. § 83(a) (requiring service providers to include in gross income the fair market
value of property received in exchange for services at the time that the property is transferable and
not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1) (as amended in 2003)
(requiring the service provider to include in gross income the fair market value of property received
in exchange for services). But see William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow
Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1142 (1974) (recognizing the valuation difficulties
A.  Claims that Section 1031 Violates Equity
Critics of section 1031 use equity in  several arguments against section
1031. These critics argue that section 1031 violates equity by granting
nonrecognition to exchanges of like-kind property while tax law generally
taxes gain on the sale of property and immediate reinvestment of sale
proceeds in like-kind property.  They claim that section 1031 violates109
equity because it grants nonrecognition to exchanges of like-kind property
but does not provide the same treatment to other barter transactions.110
Critics claim that section 1031 favors investment in real estate by allowing
property owners to move among various types of real estate investments
tax free, but the same benefit does not extend to other types of
investments.111
Section 1031 critics also apply an equity analysis to discredit the
enumerated purposes of section 1031. One purported justification of
section 1031 is that valuing property can be difficult, and therefore swaps
of property should not be taxed.  The critics argue that the inability-to-112
value justification is invalid under an equity analysis because the valuation
concerns would also be present in exchanges involving boot, but the
receipt of boot triggers gain.  The critics’ argument also recognizes that113
other provisions in tax law also require gain recognition even though
valuation may be difficult.  For example, tax law generally requires114
service providers to include in gross income the fair market value of
property received in exchange for services.115
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that arise in property-for-services transactions).
116. See Jensen, supra note 25, at 203.
117. See Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 443 (presenting the receipt of property for services, non-
like-kind exchanges, and estate taxes as examples of taxation that require payment despite potential
difficulties for the taxpayer).
118. See Jensen, supra note 25, at 213–14.
119. See id.
120. See Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 444–45 (recognizing that pre-1986 tax law provided
favorable capital-gains rates). Professor Kornhauser also recognized that Congress eliminated many
tax shelters as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 but did not consider section 1031. Id. at 445.
According to Professor Kornhauser’s equity argument, Congress’s decision to close down other tax
shelters but to leave section 1031 untouched and unexamined does not make sense. Id. 
121. See id. at 444 (“As such, [section 1031] violates our concept of vertical equity. People
with greater wealth (but tied up in the like-kind investments) pay less tax than those with less
wealth.”).
122. See id. at 407. Several different justifications have been advanced through the years as
Another purported purpose of section 1031 lies in the ability-to-pay
rationale, which provides that taxing an exchanger would cause an undue
hardship because the exchanger might have to liquidate the investment to
pay taxes.  The equity argument against the ability-to-pay rationale116
contends that because tax law ignores the inability to pay in other contexts,
it should ignore the inability to pay in the like-kind exchange context.117
Promoting economic efficiency and stimulating the economy are other
stated rationales for section 1031.  Such rationales provide in part that118
section 1031 reduces “lock-in” (i.e., the desire to hold property rather than
sell it and pay taxes on recognized gain).  The equity argument against119
the lock-in theory contends that other property owners face lock-in but, at
most, receive favorable capital-gains rates, not nonrecognition.120
Critics of section 1031 also argue that it violates vertical equity by
removing the income of wealthy taxpayers from the tax base, resulting in
a regressive tax system.  Section 1031 creates a regressive tax system121
because wealthy people hold property that they can exchange tax-free
under section 1031, but other taxpayers do not hold such property.
Therefore, wealthy people defer taxation. On the other hand, people who
are not wealthy cannot defer taxation because they do not own property
that qualifies for section 1031 treatment. As a result, people who are not
wealthy must pay tax on all of their income. Because section 1031
removes income from the tax base of wealthy people, the wealthy do not
pay tax on a significant portion of their income while the less wealthy pay
tax on all of their income. 
B.  Claims that Equity Supports Section 1031
The primary justification for section 1031 lies in continuity of
investment,  and equity supports continuity of investment. The Second122
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Congress, courts, and commentators have struggled to understand section 1031 and its place in the
tax system. See id. at 407–11 (identifying and refuting efficiency (section 1031 facilitates business
re-adjustments), administrative convenience (valuation difficulties), and illiquidity (value tied up
in illiquid investments) as other stated justifications for section 1031). Although some of the other
stated justifications may have been valid at different points in the history of section 1031, continued
investment and efficiency remain the strongest justifications. See Jordan Marsh Co. v. Comm’r, 269
F.2d 453, 456 (2d Cir. 1959) (identifying continued investment as Congress’s true intent for
providing nonrecognition to like-kind exchanges); Jensen, supra note 25, at 199 (“The strongest
justification for nonrecognition is based on the proposition that, after a like-kind exchange, the
taxpayer’s position is very close to what it was prior to the exchange.”). Because many section
1031 exchanges are multiple-party exchanges, see supra note 54, valuation is no longer an issue.
Exchangers sell property to one party and purchase property from another party. If both transactions
are arm’s-length transactions, the IRS and the exchanger could easily value the relinquished and
replacement properties.
123. Jordan Marsh Co., 269 F.2d at 456 (emphasis added).
124. See Kelly E. Alton, Bradley T. Borden & Alan S. Lederman, Related-Party Like-Kind
Exchanges, 115 TAX NOTES 467, 468 (2007) (“Equity is the basic justification for section 1031’s
continued-investment purpose. . . . That provision subjects an exchanger of like-kind property to
the same tax rules that apply to someone who remains invested in property. That’s the strongest
policy argument for section 1031.”). That article appears to be the first to make an explicit equity
argument supporting section 1031.
125. This is a result of the realization requirement. See infra Part V.C (discussing the
realization requirement). There are a few exceptions to the realization requirement under which
owners of certain property are taxed under a mark-to-market regime that do not require a realization
event. See I.R.C. § 1256(a)–(b) (2000) (applying mark-to-market taxation to regulated future
contracts, foreign currency contracts, nonequity options, dealer equity options, and dealer securities
future contracts).
126. See Alton, Borden & Lederman, supra note 124, at 468 (“An exchanger who exchanges
property for like-kind property is similar to a taxpayer who does not dispose of property—both
remain invested in property and the taxpayer who does not dispose of property does not realize
income.”).
127. See id. at 468–70 (applying a before-and-after test to exchanges to determine whether an
exchanger’s tax position changes as a result of the exchange).
Circuit stated that Congress, in enacting the like-kind exchange provision,
“was primarily concerned with the inequity, in the case of an exchange, of
forcing a taxpayer to recognize a paper gain which was still tied up in a
continuing investment of the same sort.”  This apparently articulates the123
first judicial argument that equity supports section 1031. The section 1031
equity argument compares a person who exchanges property (an
exchanger) with a person who remains invested in a single piece of
property (a holder).  A holder generally does not owe tax on the value of124
the property’s appreciation.  The equity argument provides that the tax125
law should treat exchangers and holders similarly, if the exchanger
exchanges for similar property.126
To appropriately compare an exchanger to a holder, the analysis
examines the exchanger’s position before and after the exchange.  Before127
the exchange, the exchanger holds property. If, after the exchange, the
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128. See Jensen, supra note 25, at 199–200 (“[B]ut mere appreciation or depreciation has
never been included, to any significant extent, in the Internal Revenue Code’s computation of gross
income.” (footnote omitted)).
129. Even if Pam cannot facilitate Beatrice’s exchange, Pam could structure the transaction
using a qualified intermediary, allowing her to carry out the exchange without coming into actual
or constructive receipt of exchange proceeds. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(g)(4) (as amended in
2002).
130. A mantra in the real estate industry provides that the three most important things in real
estate are location, location, location. Because Beatrice exchanges her office building for a building
located somewhere else, some may argue that her situation has changed. For example, exchanging
an office building in Manhattan, Kansas, for an office building in Manhattan, New York, would
cause a significant change in Beatrice’s position. Such a transaction would also likely require a
significant capital infusion by Beatrice. Though location may be important in real estate, two pieces
of real estate with similar value may have similar expectations for value increases and income
streams, which should be reflected in the properties’ values. Thus, an exchange of properties with
similar values would not cause a significant change in the exchanger’s position, regardless of the
properties’ locations.
131. See Jensen, supra note 25, at 202–03 (“Nevertheless, unrealized appreciation and like-
kind exchanges have a fundamental similarity: in neither case is property converted into cash or a
cash-equivalent. The investment of the taxpayer remains in substantially similar, illiquid
property.”).
exchanger holds similar property, the exchanger will be in a position
similar to that of a holder, but for the exchange. As such, the exchanger
should be subject to the same tax treatment as the holder. 
A simple example demonstrates the equity argument as applied to the
definition of like-kind property. Assume Aladdin owns Property A, a hotel,
which he purchased on January 1 for $50,000. On December 31, Property
A is worth $100,000. Because of the realization requirement, Aladdin does
not owe tax on Property A’s increase in value.  Beatrice owns Property128
B, an office building, which she purchased on January 1 for $50,000. Pam,
a real estate developer, plans to develop the part of town where Property
B is located. She offers to purchase Property B from Beatrice for $100,000.
Beatrice wishes to continue to own and manage an office building but does
not want to frustrate Pam’s development plans. Therefore, on December
31, Beatrice transfers Property B to Pam in exchange for Property D,
another office building, which is worth $100,000.129
After the exchange, Beatrice is in substantially the same position as she
was in before the exchange.  Before the exchange, Beatrice owned an130
office building, and after the exchange she owns an office building. She
never actually or constructively received the proceeds from the sale of
Property B. Because Beatrice’s situation did not change substantially as a
result of the exchange, her situation is very similar to Aladdin’s situation.
Aladdin did not pay tax on the appreciation in value of Property A; thus,
equity suggests that similarly situated Beatrice should not pay tax on the
increase in the value of her investment.131
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132. See I.R.C. § 280B (2000) (providing that expenditures incurred to demolish any structure
“shall be treated as properly chargeable to capital account with respect to the land on which the
demolished structure was located”).
133. See id. § 1012 (providing that the basis of property includes its cost); id. § 1016(a)(1)
(providing that taxpayers must increase the basis of property for costs properly charged to a capital
account).
134. Razing a building and constructing another is not a realization event. See id. § 280B
(providing that the cost to raze a building is included in the basis of the land upon which the
building stood); id. § 1016(a)(1) (requiring taxpayers to add the cost of construction to the basis of
existing structures). 
135. Assuming Beatrice wishes to dispose of her office building and obtain an apartment
complex, an efficiency analysis may suggest that she should not be able to exchange the office
This argument appears reasonable in the relatively simple situation of
an exchange of one office building for another office building. It does not,
however, provide much guidance in more complex cases. For example,
should tax law treat Beatrice and Aladdin the same if Beatrice acquires an
apartment complex instead of another office building? What if Beatrice
transfers Property B in exchange for a vacant lot or farmland? Beatrice
would appear to have altered her position by exchanging for property that
is different from her office building. She would appear to be in a situation
different from Aladdin’s position of continued investment. The equity
analysis must, however, compare Beatrice under these various exchange
scenarios to Aladdin, who does not sell his property but instead changes
the grade of his property through demolition and construction.
Consider the tax consequences to Aladdin if he were to raze the hotel
building on Property A and construct a warehouse on that property.
Aladdin would add the costs incurred to raze the hotel building to the basis
of the land on which the building stood.  Aladdin would add the costs132
incurred to construct the warehouse to the basis of the warehouse.  As a133
consequence, Aladdin would neither realize nor recognize either gain or
loss on the hotel building demolition or on the warehouse construction.134
Presumably, the value of the warehouse would be greater than the value
of the hotel, otherwise Aladdin would not have incurred the costs to raze
the hotel and construct the warehouse. Even though the value of Aladdin’s
property would increase as a result of his changed circumstances, Aladdin
would not realize or recognize gain as a result of the change.
The tax consequences to Aladdin of razing the hotel building and
constructing the warehouse provide a basis for considering the proper tax
treatment of Beatrice’s exchange of Property B, an office building, for an
apartment complex or other type of improved real property. Tax law
allows Aladdin, a holder of property, to transform the improvements on his
property tax-free. Therefore, equity suggests that Beatrice should be able
to exchange, tax free, her office building for some other type of improved
real property.135
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building for an apartment complex tax free. The cost of razing the office building and constructing
an apartment complex may make the exchange less tax elastic than an exchange of an office
building for an office building. To obtain her goal of owning an apartment complex, Beatrice may
be more inclined to exchange property and pay the tax, instead of paying to raze the office building
and construct an apartment complex. See Shaviro, supra note 27, at 34 (“[The significance-of-
change principle] suggests that sales that are a necessary byproduct of broader changes in the
taxpayer’s life or business are likely to be relatively tax inelastic.”). If the tax on the exchange
would induce Beatrice to demolish the office building instead of exchanging, the tax would be
inefficient. It would cause excess burden not only with respect to Beatrice, but it would also cause
excess burden by raising the price of the office building, which another taxpayer would acquire,
but for the increase in price caused by the tax on the exchange. See ROSEN & GAYER, supra note
95, at 337–38 (demonstrating how a tax on commodity creates an excess burden). 
136. See I.R.C. § 280B. Because Aladdin would have to add the cost to raze the building to
the basis of the property, he would not recognize gain or loss on the transaction. 
137. Allowing exchangers to exchange improved real property for unimproved real property
tax-free and allowing them to exchange improved real property for other types of improved real
property promotes efficiency. For example, if Beatrice owned unimproved land but wished to own
a factory, she could either improve the land she owns or sell it and acquire an existing factory. If
another person could use her land, constructing a factory on the land may not bring the land its
highest and best use. Furthermore, the current owner of the factory that Beatrice would acquire may
wish to dispose of the factory to trade up to a larger facility that is more suited for the factory
owner’s purposes. The factory owner could accomplish that by acquiring Beatrice’s unimproved
land and constructing a more suitable factory on the land. If a tax on the disposition of the factory
would induce the owner to raze the existing factory and build a new one instead of exchanging the
property, then the tax would be inefficient. It would raise no additional revenue but would affect
Beatrice’s actions. See ROSEN & GAYER, supra note 95, at 331 (demonstrating that a tax raising
zero revenue makes a purchaser worse off).
138. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-(1)(b) to -(1)(c) (as amended in 1991) (providing that
improved city property is like kind to unimproved farm land).
The example of changing a property’s use from a hotel to a warehouse
illuminates the analysis of an exchange of improved property for
unimproved property and the exchange of unimproved property for
improved property. Aladdin’s razing his hotel would not be a taxable
event.  The demolition of the hotel would convert Property A from136
improved real property to unimproved real property. Because Aladdin, as
a holder of property, can make that conversion tax-free, equity suggests
that Beatrice should be able to exchange her office building for raw land
tax-free. Similarly, Aladdin can construct a warehouse tax-free. Thus, he
is able to convert unimproved land into improved land without paying tax.
Under an equity analysis, if Beatrice owned unimproved land, she should
be able to convert that unimproved land into improved land through an
exchange tax-free.  Because the definition of like-kind real property is137
broad enough to include improved and unimproved real property,138
section 1031 would treat Beatrice’s exchange of Property B for raw land
the same as Aladdin’s demolition of his hotel. Section 1031 supporters
recognize this as equitable tax treatment of two similarly situated
taxpayers.
24
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139. See J.R. Lucas, Vive la Difference, 53 PHIL. 363, 364 (1978) (“Peer-groups operate at a
somewhat low emotional temperature, and the larger the group the lower the temperature usually
is. This is because the members are not alike in all respects, and, in general, if there are to be many
members, then the things they have in common must be fewer.”).
140. See Borden, supra note 60, at 28 (defining the mineral estate).
141. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (requiring inclusion of gains derived from dealings in property in
gross income); id. § 1001(a) (providing that taxpayers must recognize gain or loss on the sale or
other disposition of property). This example assumes Aladdin disposes of Property A in a taxable
transaction for consideration. Aladdin would have no gain or deductible loss if he were to transfer
the fee interest as a gift. Aladdin would receive no consideration if the transfer were a gift transfer,
so he would have no gain, and section 165 would not allow him to deduct the basis he had in the
transferred property. Id. § 165(a)–(c).
142. The definition of like-kind real property appears to be broad enough to support such a
tax-free exchange. See Comm’r v. Crichton, 122 F.2d 181, 182 (5th Cir. 1941) (holding that a
mineral interest, which was real property under state law, was like kind to undivided interests in
a city lot). Nonetheless, the definition is not broad enough to include all interests in real property.
See, e.g., Wiechens v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1085 (D. Ariz. 2002) (holding that
water rights, which were real property under state law, were not like kind to land); see also Borden,
supra note 60, at 20–32 (discussing the like-kind standard for partial real estate interests).
143. See 7 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 50.02[3][a] (Michael Allan
Wolf ed., rev. vol. 2007) (noting that a tenancy-in-common may be created by conveyance).
Section 1031 supporters must admit that equity does not, however,
support a more expansive interpretation of the section 1031 definition of
like-kind property. This is not surprising because the members of a smaller
group will likely have more in common than the members of a larger
group.  As the definition of like-kind real property expands, some of the139
property that comes with the definition will be less like other property that
comes within the definition. Equity would not support the tax-free
exchange of many properties that would come within a broader definition
of like-kind real property. For example, assume that Aladdin wishes to
convert his fee simple interest in Property A into a mineral estate.  To do140
that, Aladdin would have to dispose of all interests in Property A other
than the mineral estate. The disposition of such interests in the property
would be a taxable event.  Because Aladdin’s conversion of his fee141
interest in Property A into a mineral estate would be taxable, equity does
not support Beatrice’s tax-free exchange of her fee simple interest in
Property B for a mineral estate. Thus, to the extent that section 1031
allows the tax-free exchange of a fee simple interest in real property for a
mineral estate, section 1031 violates equity.142
The broad interpretation of the definition of like-kind real property
appears to extend section 1031 to another group of exchangers who are not
like holders of property. Consider the tax consequence to Aladdin if he
were to convert his fee simple interest in Property A into a concurrent
ownership interest, such as a tenancy-in-common interest. To do that,
Aladdin would have to sell or otherwise transfer a tenancy-in-common
interest to another person.  The transfer of such interest would be a143
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144. See supra note 141.
145. See I.R.C. § 1001(c).
146. See Rev. Rul. 73-476, 1973-2 C.B. 300 (ruling that an exchange of undivided tenancy-in-
common interests for a fee simple interest qualified for section 1031 nonrecognition); I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 200019019 (May 12, 2000) (ruling that an exchange of fee simple interests in property for
undivided tenancy-in-common interests qualified for section 1031 nonrecognition).
147. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(c)(2) (as amended in 1991); see also R. & J. Furniture Co.
v. Comm’r, 20 T.C. 857, 865 (1953) (“Leaseholds for such an extended period of time have been
administratively classified in [the section 1031 regulations] as property of a like kind with and the
equivalent of a fee in real estate within the purview of [section 1031].”), rev’d on other grounds,
221 F.2d 795 (6th Cir. 1955); Borden, supra note 60, at 21 (recognizing that the basis of the IRS’s
and court’s interpretation of the thirty-year rule related to leases is unknown).
148. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1345 (8th ed. 2004).
149. See R. & J. Furniture Co., 20 T.C. at 865 (“Thus, it appears that petitioner acquired a
leasehold interest in the property, the bare fee of which was retained, and, which, if not the
equivalent of a fee, constituted substantially all of the partnership’s interest therein.”).
150. In contrast to transferring a reversionary interest, a property owner recognizes ordinary
income when entering into a lease as a lessor. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-8(a) (as amended in 2004)
(requiring a lessor to include rent in income). But see Treas. Reg. § 1.61-8(b) (as amended in 2004)
(providing a limited exception to the general rule of income recognition on the receipt of prepaid
rent in the case of payments that qualify as section 467 loans). Therefore, Aladdin could not enter
into a lease tax free. Section 1031 preserves equity in this situation by disallowing a property owner
to enter into a lease as a lessor tax free. See Pembroke v. Comm’r, 23 B.T.A. 1176, 1177 (1931)
(holding that a lessor does not satisfy the section 1031 exchange requirement by entering into a
lease); Butler v. Comm’r, 19 B.T.A. 718, 730–31 (1930) (holding that entering into a lease as a
lessor is not a transfer of property); Borden, supra note 60, at 34–36 (discussing the different tax
taxable event  but for section 1031 or some other nonrecognition144
provision.  Because Aladdin cannot convert Property A into a concurrent-145
ownership interest tax-free, equity would prohibit Beatrice from
exchanging Property B tax-free for a concurrent interest in other property.
Nonetheless, section 1031 currently allows the exchange of a fee simple
interest for a concurrent interest.  Although generally supporting the146
concept of section 1031, equity does not support such a broad
interpretation of the definition of like-kind property.
Section 1031 treats leases of thirty years or more like a fee interest in
real property.  Aladdin could convert his fee interest in Property A to a147
lease of thirty years or more by transferring a reversionary interest (i.e., the
right to take possession of the property after the lease expires)  in the148
property to a third party. If that reversionary interest had no value, Aladdin
would recognize no income on the transfer of the interest. By treating a
leasehold of thirty or more years as the equivalent of a fee, section 1031
assumes the reversionary interest has no value.  Under that assumption,149
Aladdin can convert his fee interest in Property A to a lease of thirty or
more years tax free, and equity would suggest that Beatrice should also be
able to exchange Property B for a leasehold of thirty years or more tax
free.150
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treatment under section 1031 afforded to taxpayers who enter into leases as lessors and those who
enter into leases as lessees).
151. The owner would be able to deduct the costs of routine maintenance. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.162-4 (as amended in 1960). The owner would have to capitalize the cost of the new engine and
transmission, and the installation costs. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(a) (as amended in 1987).
152. See IPX1031 Letter, supra note 13 (providing that typical qualified-intermediary fees
range from $400 to $1,500 plus deposit-based revenue generated from exchange funds).
153. A qualified intermediary recently shared with the Author an anecdote that describes the
availability of section 1031 to a broad cross-section of taxpayers. The professional qualified
intermediary said that the smallest exchange that he ever facilitated was in the $15,000 range.
According to the qualified intermediary, the property owner was aware of the transaction costs of
doing the exchange and understood tax deferral. Because the tax benefits that section 1031 provides
outweighed such costs, however, the property owner proceeded with the exchange. Taxpayers with
subsistence income generally would not hold property that qualifies for section 1031 exchange, but
such taxpayers generally should not pay tax because of available deductions and credits.
154. See supra text accompanying note 21.
155. The information in the IPX1031 Letter does not identify the percent of the exchangers’
net worth that the exchange balances represent. The IPX1031 Letter also does not disclose whether
the exchanges represent single transactions by many exchangers or many transactions by a few
exchangers. Anecdotal evidence from the Author’s experience advising exchangers and discussions
the Author has had with qualified intermediaries indicate, however, that exchange balances often
represent a significant portion of the exchangers’ net worth.
156. To the extent that section 1031 provides a higher proportioned tax break to wealthy
taxpayers than to less wealthy taxpayers, it violates vertical equity. In that respect, section 1031
would favor the super wealthy, much as other tax provisions do. See generally Martin J. McMahon,
Jr., The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. REV. 993 (2004) (discussing how tax law
has provided disproportionately large tax breaks for the super wealthy).
Equity also supports exchanges of personal property. Consider the
owner of a truck. The truck owner could do a significant amount of work
on the truck tax free. For example, the owner could replace many of the
truck’s important components, such as its engine and transmission.  After151
such an upgrade, the truck would be like new in some respects. Because
the upgrade is tax free, equity would indicate that the owner should be able
to exchange the truck for a different truck tax free. However, because the
owner could not upgrade the truck into a grader, equity suggests that the
owner should not be able to exchange the truck for a grader tax free.
Section 1031 supporters are less skeptical of the harm to vertical equity
than are the section’s critics. In the current exchange environment,
property owners can structure exchanges relatively inexpensively with the
assistance of a qualified intermediary.  All owners of qualified property152
may use section 1031, and apparently a significant number of taxpayers
could exchange property under section 1031.  As stated above, the153
median value of an exchange facilitated by IPX1031 over an eighteen-
month period was $220,000.  If that represents the life’s saving for an154
exchanger,  allowing gain deferral on such an exchange does not appear155
to inappropriately narrow the tax base for such taxpayers.  Instead, this156
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157. See I.R.C. §§ 401, 402, 408, 408A, 501 (West 2008) (exempting from taxation certain
retirement plans). The median balance of exchange proceeds received is similar to the 2001
median household wealth for all Americans age forty-five to fifty-four with a retirement
account. See Craig Copeland, Retirement Accounts and Wealth, 2001, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST.
NOTES, May 2004, at 5, 12, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/0504notes.pdf.
Based on the information about median household wealth, if the $220,000 median exchange
balance represents the wealth of an exchanger, the median wealth of an exchanger would be
similar to the median household wealth of Americans older than forty-five with retirement
accounts. The information in the IPX1031 Letter is not comprehensive. For example, the letter
does not reveal the age of the exchangers or the wealth of the exchangers. The deficiency of
information about exchangers makes any comparison speculative, but the information reveals
the distinct possibility that exchangers, on average, are similar to the cross-section of taxpayers
who save for retirement. The information also indicates that this issue merits additional empirical
research.
     M edian Household Wealth For All Americans Age 21 or Older With 







































































158. See Brown, supra note 25, at 716 (“Providing nonrecognition treatment to the like kind
exchanger treats the exchanger like the continued holder, but creates horizontal inequity with the
seller. Similarly, imposing current tax on the exchanger produces equity with the seller but not with
gain deferral allows individuals in an asset-intensive industry, such as real
estate rental, to save money tax free, much like wage earners who
contribute to retirement plans are able to save money tax free.  157
This discussion reveals the like-kind exchange equity conundrum and
presents the challenge. Some commentators throw in the towel regarding
the equity issue, claiming that equity adds nothing to the analysis because
equity can support the respective contradictory positions of the section
1031 critics and supporters.  The remainder of this Article considers the158
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the holder.”); David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1646 (1999) (“Horizontal equity, another traditional tax criterion, is even
less helpful for line drawing than the Haig-Simons definition.”).
159. One could argue, in the alternative, to retain the concept of tax-free like-kind exchanges
but to modify the current structure to narrow the definition of like-kind real property and to
eliminate the prohibition of receiving exchange proceeds. As discussed above, equity proponents
do not claim that equity supports a broad definition of like-kind real property. See supra text
accompanying notes 139–46. Equity does, however, support the prohibition of receipt of exchange
proceeds. See supra text accompanying notes 128–31.
160. This Article accepts accretion as the criterion because section 1031 critics use it as the
criterion in their analyses, and the equity question would become moot with respect to section 1031
if consumption were the criterion. See infra text accompanying note 181.
161. If holders of property are taxed as the property appreciates, the holders would have little
if any gain to realize on the exchange of property. For example, if Beatrice purchased property for
$50,000 and was taxed on $50,000 of appreciation, she would have no gain if she later exchanged
the property for other property worth $100,000.
162. Commentators realize that a first-best setting generally is not possible. See, e.g.,
MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 70, at 228 (“Since the economy itself is complex and the tax
law must be tailored thereto, no single concept of tax base can be implemented to perfection.”).
163. The section 1031 efficiency question thus considers whether tax law may discourage the
economic activity of exchanging. It does not concern itself with whether exchanging is preferable
role that equity should play in analyzing section 1031 and provides a
solution to the equity conundrum.
V.  CONUNDRUM’S SOLUTION
Based on the arguments raised by section 1031 critics and supporters,
the like-kind exchange equity conundrum asks the following: Should
exchangers of like-kind property be taxed (1) like property holders or (2)
like sellers and exchangers of non-like-kind property?  The process of159
answering that question begins by identifying the appropriate criteria to
use as a point of comparison. This Article accepts accretion (a broad
definition of income that includes consumption and increases in wealth)
as the appropriate criterion.  Using accretion as the criterion, equity160
requires that property owners be taxed on appreciation of property. In an
ideal setting, holders would be taxed on appreciation, and exchanges
would become irrelevant in determining whether to tax.161
The analysis in this Part demonstrates that a tax on appreciation creates
inequity when property is illiquid or difficult to value. Equity suggests that
owners of illiquid and difficult-to-value property should not pay tax on the
appreciation of the property. Once equity exempts some property holders
from the general accretion rule, the analysis of exchangers must occur in
a second-best setting, in which some property holders are exempt from
taxation on accretion.  Treating exchangers of like-kind property162
differently from property holders would create excess burden and
discourage property owners from entering into like-kind exchanges.163
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to selling or whether exchanging is preferable to holding. It merely asks whether taxing exchanges
of like-kind property might discourage a transaction (an exchange) that would otherwise occur.
164. See Lucas, supra note 139, at 363–64 (“Men are all alike . . . Men are all different. We
are all alike in being featherless bipeds, language-using animals, sentient beings, centres of
consciousness, and, granted certain conditions of age and health, rational agents. Each of us is
different in spatio-temporal location, and, identical twins apart, in his genetic inheritance and the
detailed biochemistry of his body; and, at a more conceptual level, in as much as each has a mind
of his own, and can make up his mind for himself, and can make it up differently from anyone
else.”). Tax law complicates the simple comparison of humans because tax law’s definition of
person is broader than individuals. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(1) (2000) (“The term ‘person’ shall be
construed to mean and include an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or
corporation.”). Clearly the differences between humans and inanimate legal fictions such as trusts,
estates, partnerships, and corporations are significant. The legal fictions do not have emotions and
are incapable of acting on their own. The similarities are less obvious, except for the legal rights
granted to such fictions. The legal fictions, much like their human counterparts, may hold property,
have access to legal systems, and otherwise engage in commercial transactions. Thus, comparisons
exist even between humans and inanimate legal fictions that come within the federal tax definition
of person.
165. See Kent Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167,
1178 (1983) (“In order to decide what persons are relevantly equal or unequal, substantive
judgments have to be made about what characteristics count.”).
166. This hypothetical comes from a former Chinese regulation. During the planning-economy
period, the regulation provided that
there be no heating at all south of the Yangtze River; between the Yangtze and
Yellow Rivers there was only heating in offices and none at homes; north of the
Yellow River there was heating both at offices and homes. . . . Weihai was located
in the area between the Yangtze River and Yellow River, so Weihai only had
heating in the office and none in the homes.
U.N. ECON. & SOC. COMM’N FOR ASIA & THE PAC., CITIES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
LESSONS AND EXPERIENCES FROM ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, at 183, U.N. DOC. ST/ESCAP/2290, U.N.
Sales No. 04.II.F.13 (2003), available at http://www.unescap.org/esd/publications/Cities_Develop
ment.pdf.
Thus, a comparative equity rule—once the system adopts the realization
requirement and exempts holders from gain realization, the system should
exempt similarly situated exchangers from recognition—requires that
exchangers of like-kind property be treated like holders.
A.  Criteria for Equity Analysis
Every person is like others under certain criteria and unlike others
under other criteria.  To apply equity effectively, one must make164
substantive judgments about what criteria are important.  Comparisons165
without criteria based on legitimate standards may result in absurd
applications of the law. For example, the central government of a planned
economy could use geographic location as the criterion to determine who
is alike.  Based on that criterion, the central government could determine166
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167. Indeed, the Chinese government abandoned this regulation when China entered the
market economy. Id. People did not like staying in cold homes and began to heat their homes to
enjoy comfortable temperatures. Id.
168. Although this rule is less absurd than the rule based on geographic location, it is as
tautological as the other rule. One could apply either rule without comparing parties to each other.
169. Treating likes alike may also raise nonsensical, even humorous, rules, such as that
recalled by Abraham Lincoln from his experiences in the militia as a youth:
We remember one of these parades ourselves here, at the head of which, on horse-
back, figured our old friend Gordon Adams, with a pine wood sword, about nine
feet long, and a paste-board cocked hat, from front to rear about the length of an
ox yoke, and very much the shape of one turned bottom upwards; and with spurs
having rowels as large as the bottom of a teacup, and shanks a foot and a half
long. That was the last militia muster here. Among the rules and regulations, no
man is to wear more than five pounds of cod-fish for epaulets, or more than thirty
yards of bologna sausages for a sash; and no two men are to dress alike, and if any
two should dress alike the one that dresses most alike is to be fined, (I forget how
much). Flags they had too, with devices and mottoes, one of which latter is,
“We’ll fight till we run, and we’ll run till we die.”
H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE
that everyone north of a river is like each other but unlike all those south
of the river, and everyone south of the river is like each other but unlike
all those north of the river. Having established the groups of like
individuals, the government may promulgate a rule that applies to the
group north of the river and a different rule that applies to the group south
of the river. Thus, without violating the basic Aristotelian concept of
equity, the government could permit all people north of the river to heat
their homes and prohibit those people south of the river from heating their
homes. Because such a rule treats likes (everyone north of the river) alike
(allows them to heat their homes) and treats unalikes (everyone south of
the river) unalike (prohibits them from heating their homes), the rule
arguably complies with the basic Aristotelian concept of equity.
Nonetheless, the result is absurd.
The result is absurd because it establishes a criterion that only
marginally relates to the application of the rule. Because the rule addresses
comfort, a more appropriate criterion would have been comfort. People on
both sides of the river, especially those closest to the river, may be equally
cold, and thus uncomfortable, without heat.  The rule would have been167
less absurd if it had provided that people whose homes are in a location
where temperatures drop below a certain level on a particular day may heat
their homes, while prohibiting all others from heating their homes.168
Although comfort may be a more appropriate criterion for determining
which homeowners may use heating systems, the basic Aristotelian
concept of equity does not indicate the proper criteria to use. The basic
Aristotelian concept of equity does not provide a palatable result when the
criteria of comparison are absurd.  Thus, some method of determining the169
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SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT 123–24 (2002) (quoting Abraham Lincoln, Speech to the
Springfield Scott Club (Aug. 14, 1852), in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 135,
149–50 (Roy P. Baller ed., 1953)) (emphasis added).
170. Section 1031 critics rely upon criteria that indicate exchangers are like sellers (i.e.,
transfer of property), while section 1031 supporters rely upon criteria that indicate exchangers are
like holders (i.e., continued investment). See supra Part IV.
171. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 25, at 717 (suggesting that because the tax system does not
tax accretion, an equity analysis does not provide guidance regarding section 1031). Professor
Brown recognized that with accretion income as the comparative basis, section 1031 violates
horizontal equity with respect to a taxpayer who sells property for cash or non-like-kind property.
Id. at 716–17. He recognizes that section 1031 satisfies horizontal equity with respect to a taxpayer
who continues an investment in property. Id. at 716. Similarly, Professor Brown argues that
perceptional equity offers little help in analyzing section 1031. See id. at 717–18. He later uses
equity to compare involuntary conversions to like-kind exchanges. See, e.g., id. at 726–27, 734,
736; see also Weisbach, supra note 158, at 1646–47 (“If A, B, and C are all ‘equals,’ but A is taxed
differently from C, horizontal equity cannot determine how to tax B. According to the horizontal
equity norm, B must be taxed like both A and C. If B is taxed like A, horizontal equity is violated
because B also must be taxed like C and vice versa. No matter where the line is drawn, it will
violate horizontal equity.”).
172. See, e.g., MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 70, at 223–28 (analyzing income,
consumption, wage, and wealth as tax bases); Sneed, supra note 102, at 577–78 (identifying
consumption and accretion as meanings of income).
173. Accretion, or income as referred to by some commentators, includes “money income
(such as wages, salaries, interest, or dividends), imputed income (such as imputed rent from owner-
occupied housing), and appreciation (whether realized or not) in the value of assets.” MUSGRAVE
& MUSGRAVE, supra note 70, at 224. Consumption differs from accretion by not including amounts
that are saved. Id. As Professors Musgrave and Musgrave demonstrate, using wealth as the tax base
may also serve as an appropriate reference point in determining horizontal equity. See id. Because
the idea of using wealth as a tax base does not receive much attention in tax literature, this Article
does not discuss this idea.
174. See SIMONS, supra note 94, at 50 (“Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum
of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the
store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question.”). Several
arguments advance the broad definition of income. See, e.g., id. at 105–06 (suggesting that a
criteria is needed.
Even if the criteria do not produce an absurd result, two sets of criteria
may appear equally justified. Section 1031’s critics and supporters do not
agree on the appropriate criteria for analyzing the equity of section
1031.  Unfortunately, the basic Aristotelian concept of equity does not170
identify the appropriate criteria. Commentators have recognized this
dilemma in the section 1031 context.  Under the current tax system,171
regardless of the changes to section 1031, inequity could continue,
depending upon the criteria selected for comparison. 
The outcome of an equity analysis often depends upon the tax base
used as a basis of comparison.  The two general tax bases are accretion172
and consumption.  The accretion tax base is broad, including all of a173
taxpayer’s consumption and all increases in value of property held by the
taxpayer.  The consumption tax base is narrower, including only174
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broader concept of income helps evaluate existing and proposed income tax approaches).
175. See MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 70, at 224.
176. See Musgrave, supra note 95, at 113.
177. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 115 (suggesting that a consumption model offers better
solutions for personal tax than the existing accretions model); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Fairness and
a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV. 931 (1975) (arguing
against Professor Andrews’s assertion that a consumption-based tax is fairer than an accretion-
based tax); William D. Andrews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Professor
Warren, 88 HARV. L. REV. 947 (1975) (rebutting Professor Warren’s arguments against the
consumption model); Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer than an Income Tax?,
89 YALE L.J. 1081 (1980) (critiquing arguments in favor of the consumption-based model); see also
SIMONS, supra note 94, at 30–31 (“An ideal income tax should involve a minimum of obvious
inequity; and the writer believes that, in general, the broadest and most objective income concept
provides the base for the most nearly equitable levies.”). For a recent argument in favor of a
consumption base, see Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal
Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413 (2006).
178. This assumes that property owners do not realize or recognize income before the
transfers. If accretion income required annual computation and reporting of appreciation, the
transfers of property prior to such computation and reporting should trigger gain realization and
recognition.
179. Some commentators perceptively observe that at the time of the Sixteenth Amendment’s
ratification, Congress did not contemplate using consumption as a tax base for the tax system. See
ERIK M. JENSEN, THE TAXING POWER: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
62–64 (2005). Nonetheless, other commentators argue that the definition of income should be
consumption. See Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 177, at 1414. That debate exceeds the scope
of this Article; here the term “income” is used broadly to illustrate the point without accepting the
view that a consumption definition of income is appropriate.
consumption.  Like the positions scholars take in the debate over vertical175
equity, the appropriate tax base is “a matter of social taste and political
debate.”  Scholars have debated the appropriateness of the different tax176
bases for decades, and the debate will undoubtedly continue indefinitely.177
Section 1031 provides an excellent example of the importance of the
tax base in a horizontal-equity analysis. If an analyst uses an accretion tax
base, an exchanger of like-kind property will have as much income as the
seller of property.  For example, if Beatrice purchases Property B for178
$50,000 and exchanges it for like-kind Property D worth $100,000,
Beatrice will have $50,000 of accretion income. If Drew purchases
Property D for $50,000 and later sells it for $100,000, Drew will also have
$50,000 of accretion income. Because Beatrice and Drew both have
$50,000 of accretion income, horizontal equity suggests that they should
both pay the same amount of tax.
If, on the other hand, an analyst uses consumption as the appropriate
tax base, horizontal equity produces a different result. For example,
Beatrice would have no consumption income when she exchanges
Property B for Property D.  Therefore, she would have no income and179
should not pay tax on that transaction. Similarly Drew, who sells Property
D but retains the proceeds (as opposed to spending them in consumption),
33
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180. Alternatively, if the consumption tax were based on cash flow, Beatrice and Drew would
have income when they received the sale proceeds, and they would take a deduction only when they
reinvested the proceeds. See Andrews, supra note 115, at 1152. Presumably, an investment in cash
savings would qualify for a deduction. See id. at 1161–62 (suggesting that cash savings should be
deductible under a consumption tax).
181. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
would have no consumption income.  Because Drew has no consumption180
income, he should be treated the same as Beatrice, who has no
consumption income, and he should not pay any tax on the transaction.
Thus, the choice of tax base is very important in the equity analysis of
section 1031. Because the consumption tax would not tax exchanges and
sales, thus eliminating the equity conundrum, this Article accepts accretion
as the appropriate tax base for the sake of analysis.181
As long as an accretion tax system includes a realization requirement,
narrowing, repealing, or expanding section 1031 will not eliminate
inequity; rather, an accretion system will merely shift the equity split. For
example, assume that Aladdin owns Property A, which he purchased for
$50,000. Beatrice owns Property B, which she purchased for $50,000.
Cloy owns Property C, which she purchased for $50,000. Drew owns
Property D, which he purchased for $50,000. At a time when all the
property is worth $100,000 (assume all property is liquid and easily
valued), Beatrice transfers Property B for Property E in an exchange that
qualifies for section 1031 nonrecognition. Cloy exchanges Property C for
Property F in a transaction that does not qualify for section 1031
nonrecognition. Finally, Drew sells Property D for $100,000. Table 1
illustrates these exchanges, and the economic and tax implications
associated with the exchanges.
Table 1: Equity Split—Current Law













Accretion Tax Base $50,000 $50,000 $50,000 $50,000
Gross Income $0 $0 $50,000 $50,000
Tax Liability $0 $0 $15,000 $15,000
Equity Split
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182. See MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 70, at 220.
183. See id. at 219.
184. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 777 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modern Library 1937) (1776) (“The subjects of every state ought
to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their
respective abilities . . . .”).
185. See MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 70, at 223.
186. This derives from the utility definition of horizontal equity: “[I]f two individuals would
have the same utility level in the absence of taxation, they should also have the same utility level
if there is a tax.” Martin Feldstein, On the Theory of Tax Reform, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 77, 94 (1976).
187. See MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 70, at 220 (recognizing that people’s
preferences make determining benefits difficult).
To apply equity in the tax context, one must choose a tax theory. Using
the benefits theory, the abilities theory, or the utility theory will affect the
outcome of an equity analysis. The benefits theory focuses on the public
services that taxpayers receive.  Under the benefits theory, equity182
requires that taxpayers who receive similar amounts of public goods pay
a similar amount of tax.  The abilities theory allocates the tax burden183
according to taxpayers’ ability to pay.  Under the abilities theory, equity184
requires taxpayers with similar abilities to pay a similar tax.  Under the185
utility theory, equity provides that parties who are equal before tax should
be equal after tax.  Each theory brings application complexities, and186
theorists do not agree on the appropriate theory to apply. 
Examples demonstrate how the different theories may affect the equity
analysis. Beatrice exchanges Property B for Property E, which is worth
$100,000. Drew earns $50,000 on the sale of Property D. To apply the
benefits theory, one must know the amount of public services that Beatrice
and Drew receive from the government. The amount of tax each pays
should reflect the benefits received.  They both receive police protection187
and the benefits of national defense, which allow Beatrice to own her
property and Drew to sell his property. If Beatrice were completely self-
sufficient on her property, she might argue that Drew benefits from the
infrastructure, which provides no benefit to Beatrice. If Drew received
more public goods than Beatrice, equity would require that he pay more
tax. Significant information is needed to accurately assess the benefits
each party receives.
Equity incorporates the abilities theory by considering each party’s
ability to pay tax and allocating the tax burden based upon that ability.
Assuming Property E is liquid, Beatrice would have $100,000 to use to
pay taxes and Drew would have $50,000. Under the abilities theory, at first
blush it appears that Beatrice should pay more tax than Drew, but an
abilities comparison should also consider the cost each party incurs to
satisfy life’s necessities. If Beatrice has more children than Drew, then,
ceteris paribus, the abilities theory would suggest that Beatrice would
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188. See id. at 223 (“Ideally, this measure would reflect the entire welfare which a person can
derive from all the options available to him or her, including consumption (present and future),
holding of wealth, and the enjoyment of leisure. Unfortunately, such a comprehensive measure is
not practicable.”).
189. See Harvey S. Rosen, An Approach to the Study of Income, Utility, and Horizontal
Equity, 92 Q.J. ECON. 307, 307 (1978). 
Customarily, ‘equal positions’ are defined in terms of some observable index of
ability to pay such as income, expenditure, or wealth. . . . 
In order to put a discussion of horizontal equity on the same plane as the
optimal taxation literature, it is useful to define it in terms of utility rather than
ability to pay. 
Id.
190. See MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 70, at 223 (“[S]ome second-best but
observable measures must do.”).
need more resources to satisfy the necessities of her life and her children’s
lives than Drew would need to satisfy the necessities of his life. The
various factors that go into determining one’s ability to pay make the
abilities theory difficult to assess and apply perfectly.188
The information required to assess utility makes it similarly difficult to
apply in an equity analysis. For example, Beatrice may value leisure more
than she values property, whereas Drew may value money more than
leisure. In that case, a dollar of tax paid by Drew, which reduces his store
of money, would reduce his well-being more than a dollar reduction of
Beatrice’s property would reduce her well-being (assuming the tax did not
affect Beatrice’s leisure). Without perfect information, any analysis using
any of the theories must adopt assumptions that inform the application of
each theory. The following analysis assumes that each person receives
benefits from the government in proportion to income. Thus, the analysis
in this Article does not consider the benefits theory. Instead, this Article
adopts the abilities theory and the utilities theory.  To simplify the189
analysis, this Article assumes that each person’s accretion reflects the
person’s ability to pay and that the value of assets reflects the holder’s
utility.190
Based on these assumptions, under an accretion tax system, each
person has $50,000 of income, which would equal each person’s ability to
pay tax. Aladdin does not realize any income, however, under the
realization requirement, and, under section 1031, Beatrice does not
recognize income. Cloy and Drew, however, have recognizable income.
Assuming a single tax rate and that the government needs $30,000 of tax
revenue, Cloy and Drew will each pay $15,000 of tax. Each person has
$50,000 of accretion, so each should pay the same amount of tax. The law
provides, however, that only two of the four individuals pay tax. By not
taxing Aladdin and Beatrice, the law violates equity, or so section 1031
36
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191. See supra Part IV.A. Although treating Beatrice and a hired service provider differently
also violates horizontal equity under the stated criteria, the section 1031 critics focus on the
different treatment of exchangers of non-like-kind property and of sellers of property. 
192. See supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text.
193. The tax on the exchange would likely affect Beatrice’s decision whether to exchange
Property B for Property E. See Shaviro, supra note 27, at 34 (discussing the “significance-of-
change” principle).
194. See I.R.C. § 1001(c) (2000) (requiring gain recognition generally).
critics say.191
Section 1031 critics argue, among other things, that section 1031
violates equity by treating exchangers of like-kind property differently
from exchangers of non-like-kind property.  Repealing section 1031192
would eliminate the perceived inequity between exchangers of like-kind
property and non-like-kind property. Repeal of section 1031 would not,
however, solve the overall problem of inequity. For the sake of analysis,
assume that the repeal of section 1031 would not affect Beatrice’s
behavior.  If Congress repealed section 1031, Beatrice would recognize193
$50,000 of gain on the exchange of Property B for Property E.  If the194
revenue needs remained constant, Beatrice, Cloy, and Drew would bear the
$30,000 tax burden equally—each would pay $10,000 of tax. Aladdin
would pay no tax. Repealing section 1031 would therefore remove the
equity split between Beatrice and Cloy but would not eliminate inequity.
Instead, the repeal of section 1031 would merely shift the equity split to
the left. In a system without section 1031, the equity split would be
between Aladdin and Beatrice. Table 2 illustrates these exchanges, and the
economic and tax implications associated with the exchanges if section
1031 were repealed.
Table 2: Equity Split—Section 1031 Repealed













Accretion Tax Base $50,000 $50,000 $50,000 $50,000
Gross Income $0 $50,000 $50,000 $50,000
Tax Liability $0 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000
Equity Split
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195. One criticism of section 1031 is that the exchange requirement is too complex and should
be replaced with a rollover provision. See Brown, supra note 25, at 741–46. If section 1031 were
a rollover provision (i.e., if it allowed exchangers to receive relinquished property proceeds and
forgo structuring), more transactions would qualify for section 1031 nonrecognition. Such
arguments are generally made under an efficiency or convenience analysis, which identifies the
qualified intermediary as a needless element of exchanges. See id. at 744 (“[I]t seems easy to
dismiss these rules as purposeless formalism and complexity . . . .”).
196. See, e.g., McMahon, Jr., supra note 37, at 478–79 (including the recommendation to
repeal section 1031 in the part of the article entitled Base Broadening); Kornhauser, supra note 2,
at 445 (“The realization requirement is only a practical consideration. The trend today is to find
realization—and thus taxability—in more and more instances.”). Although a broader tax base may
Another way to eliminate the original equity split between Beatrice and
Cloy is to expand the scope of section 1031 to include exchanges of
property that are not like kind. This expansion would shift the equity split
to the right. If section 1031 were expanded to include non-like-kind
exchanges, tax law would treat Beatrice and Cloy similarly. That treatment
would remove the Beatrice–Cloy equity split as effectively as repeal of
section 1031 would remove it, but equity does not merely require the
elimination of the Beatrice–Cloy equity split. Table 3 illustrates these
exchanges, and the economic and tax implications associated with the
exchanges under an expanded section 1031.
Table 3: Equity Split—Section 1031 Expanded











Prop D  for
$100,000
Accretion Tax Base $50,000 $50,000 $50,000 $50,000
Gross Income $0 $0 $0 $50,000
Tax Liability $0 $0 $0 $30,000
Expanding section 1031 moves the equity split that the section 1031
critics recognize, but the critics generally do not advocate expanding
section 1031.  The lack of advocacy for shifting the equity split indicates195
that section 1031 critics may favor accretion taxation as much as they
favor equity.  More importantly, the shift fails to eliminate inequity.196
Equity Split
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be justified, the equity argument becomes tautological if the goal is a broader tax base. Instead of
making an equity argument, proponents of accretion should merely argue for a tax on the accretion
of all taxpayers whenever possible. As this Article demonstrates, however, taxing all accretion may
violate equity. See infra Part V.C.
197. The seminal work on questioning equity’s normative significance is Professor Westen’s
The Empty Idea of Equality. See Westen, supra note 75, at 537–42. Several fairly recent articles
have argued that equality remains significant. See, e.g., Simons, supra note 76, at 416–34
(demonstrating that equality as a comparative right (referred to as comparative equity in this
Article) has significance); see also Karst, supra note 88, at 247–49 (arguing that the American
concept of equality requires that we treat each other with respect and avoid stigmatizing any person
or group of people); infra Part V.D (applying a comparative equity analysis to section 1031).
Taking issue with Professor Westen’s analysis, Professor Chemerinsky argues that equality is
morally, analytically, and rhetorically necessary. Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A
Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575, 575–76 (1983) (addressing the claims made by
Expanding the scope of section 1031 shifts the equity split to the right.
After the equity shift, tax law would treat Cloy and Drew differently.
These examples demonstrate that uncertain criteria do not solve the like-
kind exchange equity conundrum. The criteria that both the section 1031
critics and supporters use are too narrow. 
As long as accretion is the criterion for measuring equity, the only way
to eliminate inequity within the tax system is to tax all accretion. By
repealing section 1031 and eliminating the realization requirement (i.e., by
adopting accrual taxation), the tax system could achieve equity in this
simple example. Table 4 illustrates the economic and tax implications of
the exchanges if section 1031 were repealed and the realization
requirement were eliminated.
Table 4: Result With Accrual Taxation











Prop D  for 
$100,000
Accretion Tax Base $50,000 $50,000 $50,000 $50,000
Gross Income $50,000 $50,000 $50,000 $50,000
Tax Liability $7,500 $7,500 $7,500 $7,500
Perhaps not surprisingly, taxing the accretion of each person eliminates
the equity split, but using accretion also makes the equity analysis
derivative.  For example, to determine the tax liability of Aladdin, one197
No Equity Split
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Professor Westen in The Empty Idea of Equality). According to Professor Chemerinsky, “the
concept of equality compels us to care about the way we treat people in reference to each other”
and is therefore morally necessary. Id. at 587. Equality is analytically necessary because it
“provides an analytical counterweight to the prejudices of dominant groups, thereby serving a
critical political function no other concept can perform as well.” Id. at 590. Finally, because
everyone can rally around the principle of equality to protect more particular principles and rights,
it is rhetorically necessary. Id. at 591.
198. As a practical matter, taxing accretion would also have a broad impact on many other
areas of the law. See generally Shaviro, supra note 27.
199. See Westen, supra note 75, at 547–48 (“Equality is an undeniable and unchangeable
moral truth because it is a simple tautology.”).
200. Id. at 545 (footnote omitted).
201. See id. at 552–53.
need not compare Aladdin to any of the other parties. One could simply
consider the amount of Aladdin’s accretion and determine the tax he owes.
Comparing Beatrice to Aladdin to determine Beatrice’s tax would be
derivative, as Beatrice’s tax would depend upon her accretion, not the tax
Aladdin paid. Such an analysis presents a significant problem because it
becomes tautological.198
B.  Beyond the Equity Tautology
Those questioning equity’s significance claim that equity is a mere
tautology.  The key to applying the Aristotelian concept of equity is199
determining who is alike. “To say that people are morally alike is therefore
to articulate a moral standard of treatment—a standard or rule specifying
certain treatment for certain people—by reference to which they are, and
thus are to be treated, alike.”  Once the standard of treatment is200
prescribed for certain people, that treatment should apply to all such
people, not because such people are alike, but because the standard applies
to such people.  Thus, if a rule specifies the class to which it applies, one201
can determine the applicability of the rule by reference to the rule. In such
a situation, equity adds nothing to the analysis of the rule’s applicability
and may lead to the wrong result if criteria become confused. The above
example demonstrates that merely comparing likes to likes is useless in an
accretion tax system because the accretion rule would determine income.
Aristotelian equity ceases to be tautological in the section 1031 context if
the criteria are imperfect or if the application of the law based on the
criteria produces an outcome that is inequitable. In such situations, equity
reveals that the criteria may not produce the correct result.
A pure accretion tax system produces equitable results only if property
is liquid and easily valued. If property is illiquid or not easily valued, the
accretion tax base is less desirable. First, the inability to value property
makes the application of a tax on accretion random. In such situations,
40
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202. See Greenawalt, supra note 165, at 1177. This is, of course, the basis for constitutional
analysis that applies the various levels of scrutiny to determine the legality of laws that treat people
differently. See id. at 1182.
203. See id. at 1173 (“The principle that unequals should be treated unequally does not deny
that unequals can empirically be treated equally . . . .”).
204. See id. at 1182.
205. See Shaviro, supra note 27, at 7.
206. See id. at 3 (“[E]veryone but a few brave souls assumes that a realization requirement is
administratively necessary or at least politically inevitable . . . .”); David J. Shakow, Taxation
Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1986)
(“Unfortunately, the accrual system has never attracted a large group of adherents because its twin
problems of valuation (How can assets be valued every year?) and liquidity (How can taxpayers
pay taxes if they do not sell their assets?) have never been solved.” (footnote omitted)). Professor
Shaviro refers to Professor Shakow as one of the brave souls who does not assume that realization
is administratively necessary or politically inevitable. See Shaviro, supra note 27, at 3 n.13.
207. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2000) (providing the formula for computing gain or loss realized
on the sale or other disposition of property); id. § 61(a)(3) (providing that gross income includes
gain derived from dealings in property).
208. See id. § 1001(c).
equity may warrant unequal treatment.  Second, taxing the appreciation202
of illiquid property threatens to produce inequitable results. 
C.  Justified Unequal Treatment and the Realization Requirement 
Although the preference is to treat equals equally, unequal treatment is
sometimes necessary.  Any unequal treatment requires justification.203 204
The realization requirement provides an example of necessary unequal
treatment in an accretion-type tax system. The realization requirement also
upholds the basic Aristotelian concept of inequity because holders of
property will not be taxed on accretion while sellers of property will be
taxed. The realization requirement generally provides that a property
holder does not have income before the sale or other disposition of
property.  The most widely accepted justifications for the realization205
requirement are the inability to value the property and the property’s lack
of liquidity.  At the point of sale or other disposition, these difficulties206
diminish, and the tax system requires gain or loss realization.  Generally,207
taxpayers must recognize (i.e., report on their tax returns) realized gain or
loss.  Section 1031, of course, provides an exception to the general rule208
requiring gain recognition. An exchanger of like-kind property realizes
gain or loss on the exchange because an exchange is a disposition of
property. But for section 1031, the exchange of property would be a
realization event triggering gain recognition for the exchanger.
1.  Valuation Difficulty
Comparing a taxpayer in an ideal, or first-best, setting to a taxpayer in
a less-than-ideal, or second-best, setting helps explain the equity rationale
41
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209. The Hohfeldian relationships are those Professor Hohfeld identified as jural
opposites—rights/no-rights, privilege/duty, power/disability, and immunity/liability—and jural
correlatives—right/duty, privilege/no-right, power/liability, and immunity/disability. See Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913). The Hohfeldian correlatives are most relevant to this Article because they
help explain important aspects of the legal relationship between two parties; namely the federal
government and taxpayers.
210. The Hohfeldian correlative of liability to pay tax is the government’s power to collect the
tax. Id. at 44–54 (discussing the correlation between powers and liabilities). The Sixteenth
Amendment’s grant of power to Congress to lay and collect taxes on income is definite. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XVI. Thus, Congress has the power and right to collect taxes to the extent a person
has income. Congress’s power to lay and collect taxes on non-income is limited. See U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (“No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census
or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”). Efforts by Congress to lay and collect tax
directly on individuals who do not have income may be an unapportioned capitation tax, which is
a direct tax that would exceed Congress’s constitutional powers to lay and collect tax. See JENSEN,
supra note 179, at 44–49. Thus, Congress will often have a Hohfeldian disability to collect taxes,
which is the correlative of a taxpayer’s immunity from paying taxes if the taxpayer does not have
income. See Hohfeld, supra note 209, at 55–58.
for the realization requirement. The analysis compares Aladdin in the first-
1 2best setting (A ) to Aladdin in the second-best setting (A ). In the first-best
1setting, A  holds property that is easily valued and liquid. In the second-
2 1best setting, A  holds property that is illiquid and difficult to value. A  and
2 1A  each purchased their respective properties for $50,000. A ’s property is
2now worth $100,000. Appraisals indicate that A ’s property is worth
between $50,000 and $150,000.
1If accretion provided the tax base, taxing A  on his $50,000 increase in
2value appears appropriate. Taxing A , however, raises difficulties because
2the range of valuations prevents a precise determination of A ’s tax base.
2 2If the actual value of A ’s property is $50,000, then A  has no accretion and
2should pay no tax. If, on the other hand, the actual value of A ’s property
2is $150,000, then A ’s income should include the $100,000 increase in
2value. An imprecise estimate of A ’s property value would create an equity
dilemma. Hohfeldian relationships help illuminate the equity dilemma and
lead to the most desirable result.209
Tax law creates a Hohfeldian liability to pay tax on income and a
Hohfeldian immunity from paying other direct taxes.  An accretion tax210
system imposes a liability on property owners to pay tax on increases in
the value of property, but this system cannot violate the property owners’
immunity from tax if the value does not increase. A perfect accretion tax
1system would correctly impose an absolute liability on A  to pay tax and
2should grant an absolute immunity to A  not to pay tax, except to the extent
of actual increase in value. An accretion tax system would not be perfect,
however, if it could not accurately determine increases in the value of
property. 
42
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2 2211. If the actual value of A ’s property were $100,000, then A ’s tax should be based on
2$50,000 of accretion. At a 20% rate, A  would have a duty to pay $10,000 of tax on the accretion.
2An estimate of A ’s property at $75,000 would result in an imposition of only $5,000 of tax (i.e.,
2$25,000 appreciation x 20%). Thus, the imprecise estimate would not reflect A ’s actual duty.
2 2212. If the actual value of A ’s property were $100,000, then A ’s tax should be based on
2$50,000 of accretion. At a 20% rate, A  would have a duty to pay $10,000 of tax on the accretion.
2An estimate of A ’s property at $125,000 would result in an imposition of $15,000 of tax (i.e.,
2$75,000 appreciation x 20%). A  had a privilege not to pay tax on the $25,000 by which the
estimate exceeded the actual value of his property. The imposition of a tax on that amount would
violate his privilege.
1 2 1213. A  and A  are not alike in two respects. First, A  holds property that is easily valued while
2 1 2A  holds property that is difficult to value. Second, A  has $50,000 of accretion, while A  may or
1may not have $50,000 or more of accretion. A  might, however, argue that equity suggests that he
2 1should not pay tax because A  does not pay tax. A ’s argument would be valid if (1) the criterion
of comparison were the continued holding of property and (2) the law did not grant an absolute
1privilege not to pay tax to those who continue to hold property. A ’s argument would be somewhat
weak because continued holding does not justify the different tax treatment; rather, inability to
2determine the actual increase in value of A ’s property justifies the treatment. This brief note
demonstrates some of the weaknesses of equity discussed above.
With imprecise estimates, the system risks imposing a tax on property
owners who do not have a liability to pay tax and not imposing a tax on
2taxpayers with a liability to pay tax. For example, if the estimate of A ’s
2property is less than its actual value, the law will fail to tax A  to the full
2extent of his duty to pay tax.  If the estimate of A ’s property is greater211
2than the property’s actual value, the government will violate A ’s privilege
2not to pay tax by collecting tax from A .  Under the assumption that the212
value of property reflects the property owner’s ability to pay tax, imprecise
2estimates will also fail to accurately determine A ’s ability to pay tax. An
2equity analysis should consider the consequence of taxing A  when the
2value is less than estimated and not taxing A  when the value is greater
than estimated. 
1 2Simply comparing common characteristics that A  and A  possess does
not adequately identify the inequity that an accretion tax would create in
a second-best setting.  Instead, the analysis in the second-best setting213
1must account for the tax’s effects on the liabilities and immunities of A
2 1 2and A , and whether the tax would equally consider A ’s and A ’s abilities
2 1 2to pay tax. If, based on an estimate of the value of A ’s property, A  and A
were subject to the same amount of tax, then the tax would be an equal
2treatment of unequals whenever the estimate of A ’s property did not
reflect its actual value. On the other hand, if, based on an estimate of the
2 1 2value of A ’s property, A  and A  were subject to different amounts of tax,
the tax would be an unequal treatment of equals whenever the actual value
2 1of A ’s property equaled the value of A ’s property. Under a liabilities-and-
1 1immunities analysis, the tax A  pays will always reflect A ’s liability to pay
tax and will never violate his immunity from paying tax. Assuming the
2estimate of A ’s property will not equal the property’s actual value, the tax
43
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1 2214. To the extent the system taxes A  and A  equally, it will treat unequals equally because
2 2the value of A ’s property will be different from the value used to determine A ’s tax. To the extent
the system taxes them differently when the actual values of their properties are equal, it would treat
1 2 1equals unequally. If the actual values of A ’s and A ’s property differ, equity suggests that A  and
2A  should be taxed differently (i.e., unequals should be treated unequally). The different tax
treatment should, however, be in proportion to the difference in their properties’ values. See
Simons, supra note 76, at 437–46 (describing the comparative-proportionality right as requiring that
if a specified class receives a defined treatment, then a second class should receive a different
1treatment in proportion to the difference in class). Thus, if the actual increase in value of A ’s
2 1property is $50,000 and the actual increase in the value of A ’s property is $75,000, A ’s tax should
2be two-thirds of A ’s tax. If the tax system is progressive, proportionality rights would require that
2 1A ’s tax be greater than 150% of A ’s tax. Under an abilities theory, the different rates applicable
to the two parties would be attributable to their different abilities to pay tax. The tax would
nonetheless be proportionately equal because the different tax rate would take into account the
different abilities. Choosing the correct proportionately different treatment is a matter for vertical
equity. Vertical equity may indeed suggest that the tax system should treat unequals unequally. The
current discussion focuses on horizontal equity and thus considers only the two stated possible
outcomes (i.e., equal treatment of unequals and unequal treatment of equals). 
2215. If the estimated value of A ’s property is greater than the property’s actual value, a tax
based on the estimated value of the property would be overinclusive because it will tax nonexistent
appreciation.
216. The tax would be underinclusive if it did not tax the difference between the estimated
2 2value of A ’s property and the actual value of A ’s property.
1217. An accretion tax system that taxes only A  would be underinclusive because it would not
2tax the increase in A ’s property’s value. Even though the amount of increase would be difficult to
2determine, if values increase, A  would not be taxed on the uncertain amount of appreciation. If the
1 2system taxed neither A  nor A , it would be underinclusive because increases in value of properties
would go untaxed. Furthermore, if the universe of taxpayers were increased to include a seller of
property, the system would be underinclusive if it taxed only the seller.
2 2A  pays will either be less than the full amount of A ’s liability to pay tax
2or will violate A ’s immunity from paying tax. Thus, under the same
assumption, the tax system must choose between treating equals unequally
and treating unequals equally.214
A symptom of treating equals unequally and unequals equally is that
the tax will always be overinclusive or underinclusive. A tax under an
accretion tax system based on uncertain values will be overinclusive if the
2estimated value of A ’s property is greater than the property’s actual
value.  The tax will be underinclusive if the estimated value is less than215
1 2the property’s actual value.  Assuming both A ’s and A ’s properties216
increase in value, an accretion system will be underinclusive if it taxes
1 1 2only A ’s increase in value or if it taxes neither A ’s nor A ’s increases in
value.  Table 5 illustrates this situation.217
44
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218. This example is adapted from an example in Simons, supra note 76, at 458.
219. The teacher would arguably have the Hohfeldian power to punish the student.
220. The second alternative may also shock the senses because the rock thrower will go
unpunished. Many people would agree, however, that punishing the innocent is generally more
damaging than allowing the guilty to go free. See, e.g., WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES
*358 (“[I]t is better that ten guilty person escape than that one innocent suffer.”).
Table 5: Valuation Rationale for Realization Requirement
1 2A A
Estimated Accretion $50,000 $0–$100,000
Actual Accretion $50,000 $25,000
Potential for Overinclusion $0 $75,000
Potential for Underinclusion $0 $25,000
In a second-best setting, the tax will always be either overinclusive or
underinclusive. An example illuminates this problem. Suppose that, during
recess, one of two students throws a rock that breaks a window.  The218
teacher did not see who threw the rock, and the students will not reveal
who threw the rock. The teacher may consider three different punishment
regimes: (1) punish both students, (2) punish neither student, or (3)
randomly choose one student to punish. The non-thrower should have
Hohfeldian immunity from punishment, and the teacher should have a
disability to punish the student.  The teacher would, however, have the219
power to punish the thrower (and the thrower would have a liability to be
punished). The legal relationships between the teacher and her students
inform the equity analysis. 
The first alternative treats unequals equally and is overinclusive
because it punishes the student who did not throw the rock. Thus, the first
alternative violates the non-thrower’s immunity not to be punished. The
second alternative treats unequals equally and is underinclusive because
the rock thrower goes unpunished. That alternative does not violate the
non-thrower’s immunity, but the teacher does not exercise her power to
punish the rock thrower. The third alternative could be equitable if the
teacher chooses the right student to punish. Otherwise, the punishment
treats unequals unequally and is simultaneously overinclusive by
punishing the non-thrower in violation of the immunity from punishment
and underinclusive by not punishing the wrongdoer.
The basic Aristotelian concept of equity does not inform the analysis,
but Rawlsian equity does. The first and third alternatives shock the sense
of right and wrong.  The first alternative is undesirable because it220
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221. Professor Greenawalt presents Lord Halifax’s firing of an entire typing pool during World
War II, when at least one member of the pool was leaking information but he could not determine
who, as an example of a situation that would justify treating unequals equally by punishing the
innocent along with the guilty. See Greenawalt, supra note 165, at 1174 (“[A]dministrative
convenience may require the same treatment of persons whose difference in relevant characteristics
is clearly perceivable at the time.”).
guarantees the punishment of an innocent student and breaches that
student’s immunity from punishment; the third is undesirable because of
the randomness of the selection process. The first alternative and the third
alternative—if the teacher punishes the wrong student—violate both
Aristotelian equity and Rawlsian equity.  Punishing an innocent person221
treats that person as less than human and fails to recognize the dignity of
the innocent. Because the teacher has a disability to punish the non-
thrower, under a Hohfeldian analysis, the first alternative is undesirable,
and the third alternative is undesirable if the teacher chooses the wrong
student. Because the teacher cannot accurately choose the wrongdoer
under the third alternative, the third alternative would be undesirable.
Thus, the second alternative, which treats unequals equally, is the most
desirable alternative.
Accretion taxation raises a similar dilemma. The system may (1) tax
1 2 1 2 1both A  and A  the same, (2) tax neither A  nor A , or (3) tax only A . The
first two alternatives treat unequals equally. The first presents the distinct
2possibility of violating A ’s immunity from the tax. The government has
a disability to impose tax unless a taxpayer has income. The government
2would violate its disability by imposing a tax on A  based on an overstated
2estimate of the value of A ’s property. Although the government may have
the power to tax a person with accretion, it is not required to exercise that
power. Of the two alternatives—not to exercise a power or to act beyond
a power—the better choice is not to exercise a power. Therefore, the first
alternative is undesirable because the government would act beyond its
power. Because the government would not act beyond its power under the
second alternative, it would be an acceptable equal treatment of unequals.
The third alternative treats equals (to the extent that the appreciation of
1 2 2A ’s and A ’s properties is equal) unequally because A  will have
appreciation but pay no tax. The government will not breach a disability
1 1by taxing only A , and A  has a liability to pay tax on his income. Thus, the
third alternative would appear to be an acceptable unequal treatment of
equals. 
Even though equity would permit the third alternative, the realization
requirement adopts the second alternative. As a consequence, the tax
system treats the holder of property and the seller of property differently,
resulting in unequal treatment of equals if the holder and seller had the
same amount of accretion. Nonetheless, the government merely fails to
exercise the power to tax the holder on known appreciation, but the
46
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2222. For example, if the property is land, A  will have to pay for a survey to subdivide and sell
2a portion of the property. A  will also incur costs to transfer title to the property. If the property is
2a building or machinery, liquidating a portion of the property may be impossible, and A  may be
required to sell the entire property to pay tax.
1 2223. This assumes that A  and A  derive the same utility from their property. 
government does not act beyond its power under the system. Even though
not taxing appreciation may violate Aristotelian equity by treating likes
differently, it is a palatable alternative because it avoids difficult property-
valuation challenges and does not require the government to act beyond its
taxing power. Thus, difficulty in valuing property is one justification for
not taxing appreciation. The other justification for not taxing appreciation
is illiquidity.
2.  Illiquidity
2 2 1The illiquidity of A ’s property also distinguishes A  from A . For the
2sake of analysis, assume that the value of A ’s property is $100,000, the
1 1same value as A ’s property. Assume that in the first-best setting A  can
liquidate his property without incurring transaction costs and without
affecting the value of the property. In the second-best setting, assume that
2A  must pay transaction costs to liquidate his property.  Further assume222
2that A  must pay $2,000 in transaction costs to sell enough property to
2meet a $6,000 tax obligation. After paying tax and transaction costs, A
1would have $92,000 of property. A , who does not have to pay transaction
2costs, would have $94,000 of property after paying taxes. A  would
1 2therefore be $2,000 worse off than A  if A  were required to pay the tax. As
1 2a result of the tax, A  and A  go from a state of similarity to a state of
1 2dissimilarity.  Table 6 sets forth the economic situations of A  and A223
under this scenario.
Table 6: Liquidity Rationale for Realization Requirement
(Effect of Transaction Costs)
1 2A A
Value Before Payment of Tax $100,000 $100,000
Disposition Costs $0 $2,000
Tax $6,000 $6,000
Value After Payment of Tax $94,000 $92,000
Selling a portion of property may adversely affect the value of the
2portion of the property retained. For instance, A ’s property might be an
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224. This value includes the $6,000 tax and the $2,000 transaction fees.
225. This result is not surprising. After all, a building without a parking lot is worth less than
a building with a parking lot because the owner cannot guarantee parking for the building’s
2occupants. Thus, the value of the building decreases when A  sells the lot. The lot standing alone
2may also be worth less, so A  cannot fetch a price by selling the lot alone that he would have
obtained if he had sold the lot with the building.
226. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
office building and an adjacent parking lot. Together the building and
parking lot are worth $100,000. To raise the $6,000 needed to pay tax and
2the cost of subdividing the property, A  must sell the parking lot for
2$8,000.  Although A  receives only $8,000 on the sale of the lot, the224
building without the parking lot is worth only $80,000.  Therefore,225
2paying the $6,000 tax costs A  $20,000. After subdividing the property,
2selling the lot, and paying the tax, A  has $80,000 of property. On the other
1hand, the value of A ’s property in the ideal setting does not diminish as
a result of selling a portion to pay taxes. Therefore, following the payment
1of tax, A  has $94,000 of property. Table 7 illustrates the economic
consequence of this scenario.
Table 7: Liquidity Rationale for Realization Requirement
(Effect of Devaluation)
1 2A A
Value Before Payment of Tax $100,000 $100,000
Disposition Cost $0 $2,000
Tax $6,000 $6,000
Devaluation $0 $12,000
Value After Payment of Tax $94,000 $80,000
Under a utility theory, a tax on illiquid property violates equity because
the tax causes parties whose position was the same before the tax to be
different after the tax.  In fact, a tax on appreciation of liquid property,226
but not on the appreciation of illiquid property, would also violate equity
1 2under the utility theory. If A  had to pay tax, but A  did not, then after the
1tax, A ’s property would be less valuable than before, while the value of
2 1 2A ’s property would remain the same. Thus, between A  and A , an
equitable result would obtain if neither party paid tax.
This analysis demonstrates that valuation and liquidity warrant both the
realization requirement and the differing treatment of holders of certain
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227. From an efficiency standpoint, a taxpayer would be less likely to acquire illiquid property
if the law required payment of taxes on increases in the property’s value. The transaction costs
required to liquidate illiquid property would influence taxpayers to purchase liquid property, ceteris
paribus. See Shaviro, supra note 27, at 27 (“[T]he Time One analysis suggests attempting to
minimize the influence of tax considerations on taxpayer decisions to make a particular
investment.”).
228. In a multiple-party exchange, an exchanger transfers relinquished property to one party
and acquires replacement property from another party with a qualified intermediary facilitating the
exchange. See supra notes 49–57 and accompanying text. Assuming that the relinquished-property
buyer and the replacement-property seller are not related to the exchanger and the transactions are
otherwise at arm’s length, the price the buyer pays for the relinquished property and the price the
seller receives for the replacement property will reflect the properties’ fair market values. Thus,
valuation generally is not an issue in most section 1031 exchanges. See Kornhauser, supra note 2,
at 443 (arguing that valuation does not provide a valid argument even in a direct swap).
2229. To qualify for the qualified-intermediary safe harbor, B  would have to assign her rights
to receive the proceeds for Property B to a qualified intermediary. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-
1(g)(4)(v) (as amended in 2002). The assignment of rights helps create a fictitious exchange
2 2between B  and the qualified intermediary, and prevents B  from accessing the exchange proceeds.
property compared to other taxpayers, such as sellers, whose consideration
received in exchange for property is liquid and easy to value.  The227
analysis also demonstrates that the realization requirement is not justified
with respect to all property to which it applies. The realization requirement
should apply only to property that is either difficult to value, illiquid, or
both. Thus, equity does not require not taxing the appreciation of certain
types of property, such as publicly traded securities, that are liquid and
easily valued.
To the extent that ease of valuation and liquidity justify the realization
requirement, they should justify nonrecognition for transactions involving
property that is illiquid or difficult to value. The analysis can test for those
characteristics by comparing other taxpayers in a first-best setting to
taxpayers in a second-best setting. For example, in the first-best setting,
1Beatrice (B ) transfers liquid property in exchange for liquid property; in
2the second-best setting, Beatrice (B ) transfers illiquid property for illiquid
property. Most exchanges are multiple-party exchanges, so the analysis
assumes that in both the first-best setting and second-best setting Beatrice
can accurately value the property transferred and the property received.228
Thus, the analysis focuses solely on liquidity.
2If B  lacks the power to access exchange proceeds as part of the
exchange, then the exchange in the second-best setting raises the same
2 2issues that continued investment raises for A . B  would incur costs to sell
a portion of the relinquished property or a portion of the replacement
property, and such a sale would diminish the value of the retained
2 2property. B ’s exchange, however, is a multiple-party exchange; thus, B
could access a portion of the sale proceeds to pay taxes without incurring
any transaction costs or devaluing the proceeds.  Generally, exchangers229
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2Before assigning rights to create the fiction, however, B  could access the proceeds without
incurring significant transaction costs and devaluing property. A smaller amount of exchange
2proceeds may affect the size and type of replacement property B  could acquire, which might mean
the replacement property will not be adequate to replace Property B. That insufficiency of the
replacement property is different, however, from the liquidity argument. To the extent diminished
purchasing power could be a valid argument for not taxing exchanges, it might also apply to
property sales. That possibility is a topic for another discussion. See Jensen, supra note 25, at 204
(recognizing that an exchanger may exchange from an illiquid property into a liquid property, thus
undermining illiquidity arguments, at least in part).
230. See supra text accompanying notes 180–82 and Table 1.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 178–82 and Table 1.
232. Apart from equity consequences, Professor Shaviro also recognized that once the system
deviates from the preferred broad tax base, efficiency may suggest varying tax treatment based on
tax elasticity. See Shaviro, supra note 27, at 4.
233. See Simons, supra note 76, at 416–52 (describing the normative significance of
comparative equity rights). 
234. See id. at 424 (providing examples of explicit and implicit comparative rights of specified
classes in relation to the treatment of other specified classes).
235. The reason for such a law may be that the lawmakers believe that drivers of freight trucks
are more sensitive to adverse driving conditions and will slow down as needed to maintain a safe
driving speed.
will be able to value property and have access to liquid assets during the
exchange interstice, eliminating the liquidity problem. 
Referring back to a previous example, the same analysis would apply
to Cloy, who exchanges non-like-kind property.  Neither valuation nor230
liquidity concerns arise for Drew, regardless of the setting in which he
sells his property.  In both situations, Drew can value his property, and231
the cash he receives is liquid. Thus, the factors that justify the realization
requirement generally do not justify relieving exchangers and sellers of tax
liability. Even though valuation and liquidity do not support not taxing
like-kind exchanges, comparative equity suggests that tax law should treat
exchangers of like-kind property similarly to holders of property.
D.  Comparative Equity
Once tax law treats property holders differently from other taxpayers,
the system will have an equity split.  Comparative equity should232
determine the placement of the equity split.  Comparative equity233
provides that if a particular group receives a certain treatment, then some
other group should receive the same treatment.  An example contrasts a234
privilege created by law with a privilege derived from comparative equity.
A state sets its speed limit for freight trucks at seventy miles per hour.
Thus, freight trucks have a privilege to travel at seventy miles an hour but
may travel more slowly. The state also provides that drivers of passenger
vehicles cannot pass freight trucks or travel faster than seventy miles per
hour.  The law does not determine the speed limit for passenger vehicles235
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236. See Simons, supra note 76, at 424.
237. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
238. See, e.g., Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 660–66 (1975) (striking down a New
Hampshire tax that, in application, taxed only nonresidents); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395,
406 (1948) (holding invalid a shrimp fishing boat license fee that varied depending upon whether
the boat was owned by a resident or nonresident of South Carolina); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S.
(12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1870) (“[I]nasmuch as the Constitution provides that the citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, it follows that the
defendant might lawfully sell, or offer or expose for sale, within the district described in the
indictment, any goods which the permanent residents of the State might sell, or offer or expose for
sale in that district, without being subjected to any higher tax or excise than that exacted by law of
such permanent residents.”). 
239. See Simons, supra note 76, at 424.
240. See id.
241. See id. at 425.
in absolute terms. Instead, the speed limit for passenger vehicles will
depend upon the slowest moving freight truck traveling directly in front of
the passenger vehicle. This is an example of comparative equity. To
determine the speed limit for a passenger vehicle, one often must
determine the speed of the slowest moving freight truck.
Comparative equity may be explicit or implicit. Explicit comparative
equity provides that if one specified class receives a benefit or burden then
other specified classes shall receive the same benefit or burden.  For236
example, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution grants
to nonresidents the rights that a state grants to residents.  Thus, a state237
may not impose a tax on nonresidents that does not apply equally to
residents of the state.  Nonresidents have the explicit right to receive the238
same benefit of tax exemption that residents receive. The passenger
vehicle speed limit in the example is also governed by explicit
comparative equity.
On the other hand, implicit comparative equity provides that one class
shall be subject to the same obligation that another class bears if no
sufficient reason exists for treating the parties differently (or if a sufficient
reason exists for treating them similarly).  Stated differently, implicit239
comparative equity suggests that two parties should be treated the same if
the reasons for treating one party a certain way apply to both parties.  A240
comparative equity right is therefore implicit if it depends on the purpose
of the rule.  For example, a state law governing winter travel in241
mountainous terrain may provide that all vehicles must use adequate
traction equipment (e.g., tire chains) when traveling over a particular
summit. If this rule seeks to ensure that all vehicles have proper traction
when traveling over the summit, then the law should require a person with
snow tires to use tire chains if the snow tires do not provide traction
similar to that provided by tire chains. 
Comparative equity has normative significance because the law is
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242. See id. at 424.
243. See supra notes 205–08 and accompanying text.
244. Shaviro, supra note 27, at 34.
245. Id. at 45.
uncertain without comparing the benefits or burdens of one party to those
of another. For instance, in the first example, the speed limit for passenger
vehicles depended upon the actual speed of the slowest freight truck.
Analogously, a state’s power to tax nonresidents depends upon how it
taxes residents. In the snow tire example, the adequacy of snow tires for
traveling the road is uncertain until the traction of the snow tires is
compared to the traction of tire chains. Implicit comparative equity also
depends upon the liability or right being imposed upon or granted to
another party.242
A settled rule in tax law states that holders of property should pay tax
on the appreciation of property only after they dispose of the property. The
reason for that rule lies in the idea that taxing appreciation of property that
is illiquid or difficult to value creates inequitable results.  Under implicit243
equity, once the system exempts appreciation from taxation, the system
should likewise exempt the exchange of any property that is illiquid or
difficult to value. As demonstrated above, however, that will seldom be the
case with exchange property. Implicit equity should also require, however,
that parties be treated the same if different treatment would affect the
behavior of the party to whom the rule does not explicitly apply. Potential
behavior alteration would be a sufficient reason for not treating holders
and exchangers differently. Thus, the tax treatment of exchangers depends
upon the tax treatment of holders, if treating exchangers differently from
holders will affect the decision to exchange. In solving the equity
conundrum, the analysis turns to efficiency to determine whether to tax
exchangers like holders or sellers.
Efficiency suggests that “decisions within broad subcategories of
consumption or investment may tend to be more elastic than decisions
across subcategories. . . . This principle immediately brings to mind the
nonrecognition provisions that require a quantum of resemblance between
the taxpayer’s new and old investments (such as like-kind exchanges).”244
Under the significance-of-change principle, a property owner would be
less likely to sell and reinvest in similar property if the transaction were
subject to tax: “The similarity of the items exchanged suggests weaker
nontax reasons for exchanging them, and thus a greater likelihood that
taxing such exchangers would merely deter them, rather than raise
revenue.”  The realization requirement gives property owners an245
incentive to hold property to avoid tax. If the property owner will be in a
similar situation following an exchange, the tax on such a transaction will
deter the exchange. Thus, to promote the exchange of like-kind property,
tax law must grant nonrecognition on such transactions.
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246. Id. at 34 (“For example, I may be more easily swayed by cost factors between two urban
apartments than between either and a suburban home, and between all three of these housing
choices than between any of them and the option of economizing on housing and taking expensive
vacations instead.”).
247. See id. at 34 (“Nontax significance matters because, the greater the range and importance
of the nontax implications of a decision, the more likely the taxpayer is to have a strong preference,
and the less likely the decision is to be in such close equipoise that tax considerations will tip the
balance.”).
As exchange property becomes less similar, the support for
nonrecognition decreases. Nontax consequences are more likely to affect
investment in property across subcategories.  Thus, such exchanges are246
less tax-elastic. Because tax would be less likely to affect the decision
whether to exchange property for dissimilar property, taxing such
transactions is more efficient than taxing tax-elastic transactions.247
Efficiency supports like-kind exchanges only to the extent that the
definition of like-kind property is sufficiently narrow. The breadth of the
definition of like-kind property should depend on the tax elasticity of the
decision to acquire replacement property. That decision in turn should
depend upon whether a property holder can accomplish tax-free a change
in the form of property that would be similar to a change accomplished by
an exchange.
VI.  CONCLUSION
The answer to the equity conundrum turns on the proper treatment of
property holders. Equity suggests that holders of difficult-to-value and
illiquid property should not be taxed on the appreciation of their property.
The proper treatment of exchangers of like-kind property depends upon
that rule. Once the system exempts appreciation from taxation, an equity
split results. The system must tax exchangers of like-kind property
similarly to either property holders or property sellers and exchangers of
non-like-kind property. In the second-best setting, the proper criterion for
applying equity relies on the effect the tax would have on an exchanger’s
decisions. Taxing exchangers of like-kind property like property sellers
and exchangers of non-like-kind property would discourage like-kind
exchanges. Thus, the solution to the equity conundrum requires that the
law not tax like-kind exchanges.
Even though equity suggests that exchangers of like-kind property
should be taxed like property holders, it does not support some aspects of
section 1031. For example, it does not support a definition of like-kind
property that allows an exchanger to transform an investment into
something that a holder of property could not transform the property into
tax-free. Thus, equity suggests that section 1031 should not allow an
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owner of a fee interest in real property to exchange that property for a
partial real estate interest or a concurrent interest in real property. The law
should be modified to remove that inequity.
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